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UNIFICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATORY PROCESS: AN EMERGING
FRAMEWORK TO INCREASE
"JUDICIALIZATION" IN PENNSYLVANIA*
by Gerald E. Ruth
I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative law judges (ALJs) are the presiding officers in
both the adjudicative and rulemaking proceedings for administrative
agencies.' These judges contribute significantly to administrative law
and play a very important role in the administration of justice at both
the federal and state levels. As such, the decisions of ALJs "'permeate
every sphere and almost every activity of our national life [and] have
a profound effect upon the direction of our economic growth."'2
Despite its positive contributions to administrative law, the
administrative judicial system has been heavily criticized. The most
common criticism of this system is that it violates the separation of
powers doctrine because it allows the legislative, executive, and
judicial functions to be housed in one governmental body. Bernard G.
Segal, the respected past president of the American Bar Association,
* Reprinted with permission from 5 WIDNER J. PUB. L. 297 (1996)© 1996 by
Widner University School of Law.
*" Chief Administrative Law Judge, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, and
President of the Pennsylvania Conference of Administrative Law Judges, B.A.,
Dickinson College; J.D., Vanderbilt University School of Law.
I Some states may call the presiding officer a hearing officer rather than an
ALJ. As of the date of publication, 22 states and New York City used a central
administrative hearing office or an agency of administrative law judges to conduct
administrative hearings. For a listing of these states, see infra tables set forth in
Appendix A. In addition, as of the date of publication, legislatures in Arizona,
Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, New York, and the District of Columbia had
introduced legislation providing for a similar administrative hearing system. Chart
prepared by Administrative Law Judge Edward J. Schoenbaum, Editor-in-Chief,
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges, Springfield, I11.
(Mar. 1996).
2 Victor W. Palmer & Edwin S. Bernstein, Establishing Federal
Administrative Law Judges As an Independent Corps: The Heflin Bill, 6 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 673, 674 (1984) (alteration in original) (quoting message of
President John F. Kennedy, H.R. Doc. No. 135, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961)).
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concisely explained this problem when he stated the following:
Consider, for example, the unavoidable appearance of bias
when an administrative law judge, attached to an agency, is
presiding in litigation by that agency against a private party.
One can fill the pages of the United States Code with
legislation intended to guarantee the independence of the
administrative law judge; but so long as that judge has
offices in the same building as the agency staff, so long as
the seal of the agency adorns the bench on which that judge
sits, so long as that judge's assignment to the case is by the
very agency whose actions or contentions that judge is being
called on to review, it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for that judge to convey the image of being an
impartial fact finder.'
The appearance of judicial bias is not the only consequence of
this separation of powers violation. Individuals attending recent
American Bar Association conferences discussed other concerns that
they had with the administrative judicial process. These concerns
included the following: (1) interference with judicial independence by
high-ranking agency figures; (2) an organizational structure that
places a nominal value on the role of the Chief ALJ so that no final
office management authority is bestowed upon the Chief ALJ; (3)
delegation of substantive program responsibility to political
appointees who have little or no knowledge of judging; and (4) the
handling of personnel matters such as discipline, suspension, or
discharge.
Because of these various concerns, there has been a growing
movement at both the federal and state levels to detach the ALJ from
the agency that is presiding over the litigation.' This movement has
bred a new administrative judicial arrangement known as the
I Bernard G. Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: Thirty Years of Progress
and the Road Ahead, 62 A.B.A. J. 1424, 1426 (1976).
4 E. Earl Thomas, Management Hierarchy Can Interfere with Judicial
Independence, A.B.A. JUDGES' J., Winter 1991, at 26.
' See generally Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to
Test the Idea at the Federal Level, 65 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 266, 273 (1981)
(advocating a central panel system for federal agencies).
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centralized panel. The goal of a centralized panel is to unify the
administrative process to ensure that ALJs are completely separate
from all internal agency processes. The sole task of the centralized
panel judge is to hear cases involving a variety of agencies. No longer
will the ALJ be "susceptible to manipulation by agency managers
who are responsible for program administration."6 No longer will the
ALJ be involved in the operational control of compensation, tenure,
personnel, equipment, and physical location of the in loco parentis
agency. No longer will the ALJ appear "attached to an agency."7 The
centralized system results in a truly independent adjudicatory
agency.'
In addition to eliminating the lack of impartiality, there are other
benefits that can accrue from this new arrangement. These benefits
include the following: significant cost savings,' "a more efficient...
6 Thomas, supra note 4, at 26.
7 Segal, supra note 3, at 1426-28.
8 One commentator noted that although "adoption of a central panel system
does not guarantee the independence of the ALT from the agency, the central
panel is likely to be accompanied by greater independence." L. Harold Levinson,
The Central Panel System: A Framework that Separates ALJs from Administrative
Agencies, 65 J. AM. JUDICATURE SoCy 236, 245 (1981).
9 For example, the Minnesota Public Utility Commission saved $88,670 from
the budgeted amount the first year a centralized panel was in place and $166,000
the second year. See Duane R. Harves, Making Administrative Proceedings More
Efficient and Effective: How the ALJ Central Panel System Works in Minnesota,
65 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 257, 263 (1981). Also, the Minnesota Department
of Commerce reduced its hearing costs by 50 percent in one year. Id. The costs
dropped from $120,000 to $60,000. Id. In a 1986 Senate Committee Hearing,
then-Chief Judge Ronald I. Parker of the New Jersey Office of Administrative
Law Judges testified that
the centralization of the hearing function has resulted in demonstrable
economics of scale. By comparison, the State cost for the hearing
process eight years ago was more than five million dollars. The
overall New Jersey State budget at that time was $4.1 billion. Today, the overall
State budget totals $8.9 billion. OAL's budget for the hearing process is $6.2
million. In other words, since the creation of OAL, State spending has increased
over 100%, while contested case costs have only increased by 24%. This has all
been accomplished despite the fact that our caseload has doubled since 1979,
while our initial staff size has been reduced.
Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S. 673 Before the Subcomm.
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[and] effective administrative hearing process," "o and the attraction of
more experienced and qualified personnel.
Because of these potential advantages, the central panel became
popular on the state level during the 1970s and 1980s, and the 1981
Model State Administrative Procedures Act adopted the central panel
system." In addition, centralization measures have been discussed
repeatedly in Congress.12 The positive effects of this restructuring
suggest that centralization of the administrative judicial process
should be considered by all fifty states. 3 To date, however, only
twenty-two states actually employ such an arrangement. 4
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1986). The 1995 budget was approximately $9.6
million. Telephone Interview with Michael Boccanfuso, Chief of Budget and
Finance, New Jersey Office of Administrative Law (March 19, 1996).
0 Harves, supra note 9, at 265.
Levinson, supra note 8, at 238. Neither the 1946 nor the 1961 version of
the Model State Administrative Procedures Act referred to the central panel
concept. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (198 1) (approved and
recommended for enactment in all states at the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Annual Conference in New Orleans,
Louisiana, July 31-August 7, 1981). The fact that neither of these versions
referred to a central panel system is not surprising given that at that time, only
one state used such a system. By 1981, when the Model Act was revised, at least
seven states had adopted the central panel system. Id. One authority includes
Washington as an eighth state. However, Washington's central panel system
actually came into existence in 1982. Duane R. Harves, The 1981 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act: The Impact on Central Panel States, 6 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 661, 662 (1984).
Judge Harves argued that "[tihe provisions . . . are deficient in two respects.
First, while proclaiming its independence, it is proposed [that the Office of
Administrative Hearings be included] within an existing executive branch
agency." ki. Second, another proposal gives the above option to an adopting state,
and it grants the agencies the power to designate one or more other persons to
preside unless otherwise prohibited by law. Thus, such "state agencies would not
be compelled to use the [Office [of Administrative Hearings]." Id.
12 For a discussion of the efforts made by Congress to implement a central
panel system, see infra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
13 Levinson, supra note 8, at 238.
14 Although the central panel systems vary from state to state, they are more
similar than different. The most significant similarity is that the central panels are
comprised of independent administrative law judges rather than of personnel
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Unfortunately, Pennsylvania is one of the states that has not yet
adopted a centralized system--despite recommendations from a study
undertaken by the American Bar Association's (ABA) Center for
Administrative Justice, made at the request of both academics and the
Pennsylvania Department of Justice.I5
The purpose of this Article is to emphasize that the time has
come for Pennsylvania to adopt a centralized panel system. To
support this proposal, this Article begins with a summary of
statements made by authorities in Pennsylvania who have suggested
that Pennsylvania adopt a central panel system. In addition, this
Article reviews the attempts made at the federal level to adopt such
a system. It also reviews various aspects of the central panel systems
implemented by the twenty-two central panel states and discusses
some of the similarities and differences that exist among the systems,
as well as the benefits that these central panel states have reaped. One
may reasonably anticipate that, if Pennsylvania adopted a centralized
panel system, it would reap many of the same benefits that its sister
states, which have already adopted central panel systems, are
currently experiencing. Finally, this Article proposes specific
recommendations for the Pennsylvania legislature to consider when
establishing a central panel system.
supervised by, and accountable to, the state agency. See infra Appendix A.
"5 Jeffrey G. Cokin & Jonathan Mallamud, Hearing Officers in Pennsylvania:
Recommendation for an Independent Central Office, 15 DUQ. L. REv. 605, 605
(1977); see also id. at 605 n.3, 606 n.4 (indicating that the final report submitted
to the Pennsylvania Department of Justice in 1975 was the basis for the
department's draft of the Administrative Hearing Officer Act, promulgated in
1977).
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1I. THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE NEED FOR A
CENTRALIZED SYSTEM IN PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania is not immune from the due process shortcomings
associated with the administrative state. Currently, administrative
agencies in Pennsylvania are governed by the Pennsylvania
Administrative Agency Law.16 This legislation, however, is not
comprehensive and, unfortunately, merely sets out an individual's
right to a hearing, 7 the right to an appeal s and the bare bones of
adjudicatory procedure.' 9 To compensate for this lack of formal
procedures, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been forced to
"constitutionalize" the process.2" The Pennsylvania Judiciary,
however, is not the only group advocating for a change in
Pennsylvania. Academics also recommended that Pennsylvania adopt
a central panel system to correct the currently existing due process
imbalances. The following sections of this Article discuss attempts
made by both practitioners and the judiciary to encourage
Pennsylvania to adopt a central panel system.
A. Recognition by Academics
Early Pennsylvania cases demonstrated the due process problems
inherent in a commingled administrative adjudication system. 2' These
decisions did not, however, directly address the issue of the need for
16 2 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 501-508, 701-704 (1988).
1 d. § 504.
18 d. § 702.
19 1 PA. CODE § 31.1(c) (1988) (providing by implication that separate state
agencies may have their own regulations).
20 See Lyness v. State Bd. of Medicine, 605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992) (holding
that it must not even appear that the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions have
been commingled); Chester Extended Care Ctr. v. Department of Pub. Welfare,
586 A.2d 379 (Pa. 1991) (finding that reliance on the action of an agency based
upon its silence and misinformation is unconscionable).
21 See Gardner v. Repasky, 252 A.2d 704 (Pa. 1969); In re Schlesinger, 172
A.2d 835 (Pa. 1961); Wasniewski v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 299 A.2d 676
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973); Donnon v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 283 A.2d 92 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1971).
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a centralized system. Arguably, the Pennsylvania Department of
Justice first recognized the need to unify the administrative
adjudicatory process when it asked the ABA's Center for
Administrative Justice to undertake a study of state agency hearings
in 1974.22 The ABA's final report recommended the establishment of
a central hearing office.23 Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Department
of Justice prepared legislation reflecting these recommendations,
however, the legislature failed to enact the proposed legislation.2 4
In a 1977 article entitled Hearing Officers in Pennsylvania:
Recommendation for an Independent Central Office, former Deputy
Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey G. Cokin, and Professor
Jonathan Mallamud, from Rutgers University School of
Law-Camden, reviewed the factors motivating the ABA to make the
proposals that it did." First, the authors discussed the prevalence of
non-uniform decisions, the judges' lack of qualifications, and the
inconsistent supervision policies associated with approximately
fifteen state agencies.26 Second, they recognized that if a hearing is to
satisfy procedural due process requirements, individuals challenging
the actions of an agency must be provided with "an opportunity to
know and confront the adverse evidence on which the government
will rely."27 Third, the authors noted:
"[T]he most critical function in the prosecution and
adjudication of administrative cases is the resolution of
disputed facts because the findings of fact which result from
administrative proceedings are subject to only limited
appellate review. The fact finding process, therefore, must be
afforded the broadest dimensions of constitutional
22 Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15, at 605.
23 Id. at 605-06 n.3 (citing JONATHAN MALLAMUD & MILTON M. CARROW,
A SYSTEM OF PROVIDING HEARING OFFICERS FOR ADJUDICATORY HEARINGS 113
(1975)).
24 Id. at 606 n.4 (citing PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER ACT (Blue Draft 1977)).
25 Id. at 606.
26 Id. at 615, 619.
27 Id. at 606 (citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S.
292, 300 (1937)).
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protection. ''2 1
Fourth, the authors tracked the development of case law involving
due process and fairness issues as they related to the administrative
adjudicatory process in Pennsylvania 29 Fifth, and possibly the most
significant contribution, the authors warned that the Pennsylvania
judiciary may soon intervene and mandate that ALJs' adjudicatory
and prosecutory functions be strictly separated.30 In so doing, the
authors heralded the coming of Lyness v. State Board of Medicine,
3 1
in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court replaced the requirement
that a party prove actual bias on the part of a representative of an
administrative agency with a standard requiring the avoidance of even
the appearance of bias in cases involving the commingling of the
various functions of administrative agencies.32
The following year, in another scholarly, case-tracking synopsis,
entitled Commingling of Investigatory, Prosecutory, and
Adjudicatory Functions in Administrative Agencies: The
Pennsylvania Due Process Standard, the author addressed
28 Id. at 607 (quoting Human Relations Comm'n v. Thorp, Reed &
Armstrong, 361 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976)).
11 Id. at 611-14 (citing Dussia v. Barger, 351 A.2d 667 (Pa. 1975); Horn v.
Township of Hiltown, 337 A.2d 858 (Pa. 1975); Department of Ins. v. American
Bankers Ins. Co., 363 A.2d 874 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 387 A.2d 449
(Pa. 1978)); see also Bernard J. Donohue, Comment, Commingling of
Investigatory, Prosecutory, and Adjudicatory Functions in Administrative
Agencies: The Pennsylvania Due Process Standard, 82 DICK. L. REv. 693 (1978)
(providing a thorough case-tracking synopsis and categorization of commingling).
30 In support of this contention, the authors cited Department of Insurance v.
American Bankers Insurance Co., 363 A.2d 874 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976), aff'd,
387 A.2d 449 (Pa. 1987), which reversed the decision of the insurance
commissioner "because the hearing officer ... was the direct supervisor of the
associate general counsel who presented the Department's case." Cokin &
Mallamud, supra note 15, at 612 (citing American Bankers, 363 A.2d at 875).
The authors reiterated Judge Blatt's warning "that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania 'is applying a more stringent standard to prevent a commingling of
the judicial and the prosecutorial functions."' Id. at 614 (quoting English v. North
E. Bd. of Educ., 348 A.2d 494, 496 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975)).
31 605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992).
32 Id. at 1211. For a discussion of the Lyness decision, see infra notes 40-48
and accompanying text.
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Pennsylvania's struggle to correct the due process impropriety that
resulted from the commingling of judicial functions in administrative
agencies.33 This 1978 piece recognized that "[t]he commonwealth
court [was] ... unwilling to apply prior supreme court precedent to
general commingling situations. The court fear[ed] that requiring
anything less than a showing of actual bias would significantly
impair the ability of the state's administrative bodies to punish
violations of the law."34 Thus the court's fear possibly stunted the
creation of a central panel system.
Since the release of the ABA report and these law review articles,
very little has been published regarding the need for a central panel
system in Pennsylvania. Quite possibly, this is because the
commonwealth court required that actual bias be shown in cases
involving general commingling of functions within an agency, but
that a showing of the appearance of bias is adequate in cases where
one individual performed the commingled functions.35 Whatever the
reason for this dormancy, recent activity by the Pennsylvania
judiciary has again brought the issue to the forefront.
B. Judicial Intervention Comes True
In January 1991, the commonwealth court in Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. City of Reading3 reiterated the need to prove the existence
of actual prejudice. The court stated:
The basic due process requirement that there be a fair trial
before an impartial tribunal is applicable to administrative
[hearings] as well as to courts. Potential dangers exist when
there is a commingling of the investigative, prosecutorial and
adjudicative functions. We have recognized that the due
process requirement of a fair trial is violated when these
functions are commingled in a single individual and that due
3 Donohue, supra note 29, at 693.
11 Id. at 703 (emphasis added); see Bruteyn v. State Dental Council &
Examining Bd., 380 A.2d 497 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
1 Donohue, supra note 29, at 700-10.
36 585 A.2d 1166 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
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process may be violated when these functions are performed
by different individuals within the same administrative
entity. The test in the latter situation is whether the functions
performed are adequately separate so that there is no actual
prejudice.3"
The commonwealth court held that bias tainted the
decision-making process, and acknowledged that evidence of a
"symbiotic" relationship can be sufficient to show the lack of proper
separateness.38 The court also noted that "' [t]he role of the prosecutor
is to fashion as strong a case against the accused as the evidence will
allow... [which] is manifestly at odds with the impartiality required
of the adjudicator."'39
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally addressed the
commingling issue in Lyness v. State Board of Medicine ° and
mandated a change in the structure of administrative agencies in
37 Id. at 1169 (citations omitted). The court also provided guidelines to help
determine whether actual bias existed:
[In order t]o ascertain bias when the prosecutorial and adjudicative
functions are performed b , different individuals within the same
administrative agency, we examine two factors: first, does anything of
record indicate improper commingling of the functions performed by
the involved individuals; and second, has one such individual concerned
himself with the other's activities.
Id. (citing Board of Pensions and Retirement v. Schwartz, 510 A.2d 835 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986), appeal granted, 520 A.2d 1387 (Pa. 1987)). In this case,
there existed evidence "of cooperation between the Council, an advocacy group
whose role is prosecutorial in nature, and the Commission." Id.
38Id. at 1170.
39 Id. (quoting Bruteyn v. State Dental Council & Examining Bd., 380 A.2d
497, 501 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977)). The court cited cases from several agencies
in arriving at its decision: FR & S, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Resources, 537 A.2d 957 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), aff'd, 560 A.2d 1392 (Pa.
1989); Horsley v. Philadelphia Board of Pensions and Retirement, 510 A.2d 841
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 546 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 1987); Bruteyn, 380 A.2d
497; and Human Relations Commission v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 361 A.2d
497 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
40 605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992); see Daniel B. Vukmer, Note, Lyness v. State
Board of Medicine: Commingling of Prosecutorial and Adjudicative Functions,
2 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 283 (1992).
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Pennsylvania. The supreme court, recognizing the well-established
principle that "'due process is fully applicable to adjudicative
hearings,"'4 stated what it thought was a "clear path when it [came]
to commingling prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions."42 The
supreme court overruled the Georgia-Pacific decree necessitating
proof of actual bias. Referring to prior cases, the supreme court
reasoned:
Due process is not swept under the carpet simply because it
is transgressed by a group of people, rather than a single
individual. Indeed, the due process guaranty of the
Pennsylvania Constitution is primarily directed at
governmental (i.e. state) action, which generally presumes
action of a municipal, administrative, or state governmental
body, rather than a single individual.
Thus, a mere possibility of bias under Pennsyivania law
is sufficient to raise the red flag of protection offered by the
procedural guaranty of due process. . . . [T]he mere
appearance of bias must be avoided .... 43
Following the lead of the supreme court, one month after Lyness, the
commonwealth court acknowledged that to avoid the "appearance of
impropriety" the administrative adjudicatory function must be distinct
from the prosecutorial function.4
On January 14, 1993, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
again had the occasion to apply the Lyness rationale when it decided
41 Lyness, 605 A.2d at 1207 (quoting Soja v. Pennsylvania State Police, 455
A.2d 613, 615 (Pa. 1982)).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1208 (citing Dussia v. Barger, 351 A.2d 667 (Pa. 1975); Gardner v.
Repasky, 252 A.2d 704 (Pa. 1969)).
44 Copeland v. Township of Newtown, 608 A.2d 601, 602 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1992) (holding that the board which suspended a police officer could not then sit
as an impartial jurist on appeal); see also Giffin v. Chronister, 616 A.2d 1070
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (involving a complaint in equity brought against the
insurance commissioner alleging an unconstitutional commingling of prosecutorial
and adjudicative functions).
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Bunch v. State Board ofAuctioneer Examiners.45 In Bunch, the board
of examiners revoked an auctioneer's license. On appeal, the appellant
argued that there was a "commingling of the prosecutorial and
adjudicatory functions,"46 and the commonwealth court agreed. The
court reversed and remanded the license revocation order. In so
doing, the court referred to the language in the Lyness decision that
"'even an appearance of bias and partiality must be viewed with deep
skepticism."'47 The court further noted that Lyness instructed that
when commingling occurs:
"The accused is forced to face the same body which heard
allegations and formed prosecutorial judgments concerning
probable cause (some of it perhaps inadmissible as formal
evidence), now dressed in the robe of an impartial jurist.
Such a schizophrenic face of justice, poses subtle dangers
which threaten complete objectivity and is not permissible
under the due process guaranty of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, as interpreted by this Court for over three
decades."48
Thus it seems clear that by 1993 in Pennsylvania the mere appearance
of the commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions
within administrative agencies was enough to constitute a due process
violation, and that proof of actual bias was no longer a necessary
prerequisite.
C. Post-Lyness & Bunch
The Lyness mandate thus requires that two questions be
answered. First, how does the current administrative system in
Pennsylvania comply with this new mandate? Second, how will the
system function in the twenty-first century? One would think that the
best way to answer these questions would be to ask those in the
system how they perceive the present law and how they intend to
45 620 A.2d 578 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).46 Id. at 581.
Id. (quoting Lyness, 605 A.2d at 1207) (emphasis in original).
48 Id. at 582 (quoting Lyness, 605 A.2d at 1211).
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comply with the strictures of Lyness. Unfortunately, because there is
not a uniform system of administrative adjudications in Pennsylvania
it is difficult to obtain a straight answer to either question. What can
be said with certainty, however, is that little has changed, at least with
respect to the structure of the administrative system in Pennsylvania,
since Lyness and Bunch. One year after Bunch, the commonwealth
court acknowledged that the Unfair Insurance Practices Act49
contained language authorizing commingling of an insurance
commissioner's duties. ° However, in a six-to-one decision, the
commonwealth court held that within the agency there existed
sufficient "walls of division" separating the prosecutorial and
adjudicatory functions. 1
The tone of most of the commonwealth court opinions has been
to mute the original Lyness mandate by limiting its application. The
court stamped due process approval on less than full board and less
than quorum adjudications, even when the commingled
prosecutorial-adjudicatory brush tainted certain board members.5 2 It
49 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1171.1-.15 (1992).
50 Stone & Edwards Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Department of Ins., 636 A.2d 293,
298 (Pa. Commw. Ct.) (en banc) (requiring actual environment of commingled
functions), aff'd, 648 A.2d 304 (Pa. 1994); see also George Clay Steam Fire
Engine & Hose Co. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 639 A.2d 893,
904 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (concluding that there was no commingling when 11
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission members made final adjudications in
cases in which commission staff members made findings of probable cause);
Cooper v. State Bd. of Medicine, 623 A.2d 433, 436 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993)
(holding that members of the State Board of Medicine may render a final
adjudication as long as they were not involved in making the prosecution
recommendations).
51 Stone & Edwards Ins. Agency, 636 A.2d at 300; see also Lyness, 605 A.2d
at 1209 (providing that "[w]hat our Constitution requires... is that if more than
one function is reposed in a single administrative entity, walls of division be
constructed which eliminate the threat or appearance of bias" (emphasis added)).
52 See Jabbour v. State Bd. of Medicine, 638 A.2d 406 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994); Merchant v. State Bd. of Medicine, 638 A.2d 484 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994); Batoffv. State Bd. of Psychology, 631 A.2d 781 (Pa. Conunw. Ct. 1993);
Cooper v. State Bd. of Medicine, 623 A.2d 433 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal
denied, 636 A.2d 635 (Pa. 1993).
However, in Marich v. Pennsylvania Game Comm., 639 A.2d 1345 (Pa.
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also required raising the due process issue at the board level;
otherwise, it considered the issue to be waived.53
It is a shame that little has changed regarding the commingling
of the prosecutorial and adjudicatorial functions, especially
considering that Pennsylvania possesses a rather disjunctive and
non-uniform administrative adjudicatory process with various
"fabricated" walls of division. 4 The most prominent example of this
disjunctive system can be seen in the variety of agency decision
making and hearing officer arrangements." These arrangements cover
Commw. Ct. 1994), rev'd, 666 A.2d 253 (Pa. 1995), the commonwealth court
held that the Pennsylvania Game Commission violated the petitioner's due process
rights. Id. at 1347. The court based its holding on the fact that the hearing officer,
a member of the Bureau of Law Enforcement of the Pennsylvania Game
Commission, and the only Commonwealth employee present, "presented the
Commonwealth's evidence; questioned the parties; and made recommended
findings of fact and conclusions of law" which were adopted by the commission
in toto. Id. at 1346. The commonwealth court held that this "appearance of bias"
constituted an improper commingling of the prosecutorial and adjudicatory
functions. Id. at 1347. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the commonwealth court, holding that the denial of due process for a hunting
license is not constitutionally protected because it is not a deprivation of a
person's life, liberty, or property interest. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v.
Marich, 666 A.2d 253, 257 (Pa. 1995).
13 See Singer v. State Board of Psychology, 633 A.2d 246 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1993).
14 As early as 1977, the authors of Hearing Officers in Pennsylvania:
Recommendation for an Independent Central Office verified this diqjunctiveness
when they stated that "[a]t present, Pennsylvania does not have a uniform system
for making examiners available." Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15, at 615.
5' Cokin and Mallamnud described the disjunctive nature of the administrative
process in Pennsylvania in the following manner:
Both the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and the Pennsylvania
Securities Act of 1972 forbid the delegation of the hearing function;
hearings in those agencies are conducted by the agency head or panels
of members of [that particular] agency, Similarly, hearings concerning
the fixing of milk prices must be heard before one or more members
of the Milk Marketing Board. Initial hearings are also held before members of
such boards and commissions as the Commission on Charitable Organizations, the
Industrial Board, and several of the licensing boards within the Bureau of
Professional and Occupational Affairs.
... IIln workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation
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a wide range of procedures, including processes in which "the
administrative head conducts the hearing and renders a decision, to
the use of part-time hearing officers either hired from outside the
government on a contract basis or drawn from the existing legal staff
of the agency."5 6 In addition, the use of nonlawyers as hearing
cases, hearings are conducted by full-time employees who are subject
to the state's civil service law. [Conversely, for licensing matters, tihe
Liquor Control Board [(LCB)], employs on an annual salary basis,
part-time hearing officers who are permitted to maintain their own law
practices. [For enforcement hearings, however, the LCB retains
full-time, independent ALJs.] In the Department of Agriculture,
hearing officers are hired pursuant to a service contract and are paid on
a per diem basis. Many other agencies, including the Department of
Education and the Department of Labor and Industry, use an assistant
attorney general or the agency's chief counsel to conduct hearings.
Usually the hearing function is only one of a wide variety of duties
these individuals perform. [By comparison, iun the Department of
Health, hearing officers are hired on an ad hoc basis in cases regarding
new health care facilities.
Id. at 615-16 (footnotes omitted).
56 Id. at 615. Although remaining, for the most part, in a relatively unaltered
state, "[tihe hearing officer arrangement has . . . been changed in at least two
agencies." Id. at 616. For example:
[iln the Department of Public Welfare, a. .. "Hearing and Appeals
Unit" was created 'circa 1975] in response to a consent decree issued
by a federal district court. And, [because] many aspects of the hearing
system previously used by the Public Utility Commission [(PUC)] did
not meet the due process requirements of the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions, legislation [was passed in 1976] to improve
the PUC's hearing system [by providing for] administrative law judges
[to] hear cases and write recommended decisions.
Id. at 616-17 (footnotes omitted).
In addition, one commentator pointed out that, although the improvement in
the hearing system at the PUC was a "positive step," perhaps it did not go far
enough. He noted that
[t]he Senate Consumer Affairs Committee's Report, upon which the
legislation was based, made some additional recommendations affecting
commingling within the PUC. Before the new Act, the hearing officer
simply presided at the hearing to control the admission of evidence.
The Committee proposed, and its proposal was eventually accepted,
that the office of administrative law judge, patterned after the federal
model, be created. When he acts in place of the Commissioners, the
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officers is not an uncommon practice.57 To complicate matters
further, some heads of agencies delegate hearing functions to full- or
part-time employees or to their own personnel.58 These delegated
adjudicatory powers range from ruling on the admissibility of
evidence to making recommendations, binding and non-binding
findings, automatically reviewable decisions, and final decisions
unless appealed. 9
Cokin and MallamudO and Donohue6' confirmed the existence
of this administrative morass. These authors, however, also presented
scholarly reviews of alternative systems.62 These alternatives included
creating partial central office systems,63 implementing separate
internal systems within the agency,' maintaining the existing system
presiding officer is now entitled to make a tentative decision and submit
it to the Commission. Both the Committee and the legislature could
have gone further, however, and provided that the administrative law
judge's findings of fact be conclusive. If the hearing is truly to serve as
a "trial court," the judge should have been given greater independence.
It serves riot only to separate functions within the agency, but also to
further other agency purposes. Current procedures also allow the
Commission to hear a case de novo on appeal.
Donohue, supra note 29, at 715 (footnotes omitted).
11 For instance, the Pennsylvania "Labor Relations Board... utilizes some
nonlawyers as hearing officers." Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15, at 617.
Similarly, "[tihe Board of Probation and Parole and the Bureau of Traffic Safety
of the Department of Transportation also utilize nonlawyers to conduct hearings."
Id. (footnote omitted).
58 Id. at 615.
11 See, e.g., 47 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4-402 (Supp. 1995) (providing that the
LCB may delegate to hearing officers who will make recommendations on license
requests).
60 Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15.
6t Donohue, supra note 29.
62 Cokin & Mallamud, supra note !5, at 622-26; Donohue, supra note 29, at
716-18.
63 Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15, at 623. Partial central office systems
include a completely centralized office and an office that has a few ALJs to
service only a few of the agencies. Id.
64 Donohue, supra note 29, at 717-18.
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with statutory restrictions,65 prohibiting commingling of functions,66
requiring minimum qualifications or civil service testing,67 limiting
part-time employment, 68 and requiring the filing of informational
statistical reports. 69
One commentator suggested that "[t]he best solution would be a
formal internal separation within the agency."70 The goal of this
compromise would be to maintain a consistent agency policy and to
provide for protection against the commingling of prosecutory and
adjudicatory functions.7 This solution, however, does not address the
fact that there cannot be a truly autonomous and independent
adjudicatory body within an agency when: (1) the offices are in the
same building; (2) the agency seals are the same; (3) the assignment
of the adjudicator is made by the same agency; (4) the staff and
personnel 'are hired, promoted, disciplined, and paid by the same
agency; and (5) the same agency approves or disapproves the
purchase of the equipment, furniture, paper, bills, utilities, travel,
education, and the like.72
A general statute placing restrictions on the commingling of
functions and requiring minimum qualifications would also be an
improvement, "but would not render certain a fundamentally fair
hearing with the appearance of impartiality [required by Lyness,]
while maintaining the necessary administrative efficiency."73 Finally,
65 Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15, at 622. The statute, as an example,
would forbid a person who is the decision-maker from obtaining legal advice from
the prosecutor. Id.
66 Donohue, supra note 29, at 694-95.
67 Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15, at 622. An alternative to civil service
testing is a requirement that all hearing officers have a law degree. Id.
id. at 623 (suggesting that limiting part-time employees should be combined
with mandating minimum training requirements).
69 Id. The reports should include "the number of cases heard [by the hearing
officer], time of disposition, appeals taken, and other relevant [information]." Id.
70 Donohue, supra note 29, at 717.
71 Id.
72 UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE STUDY OF THE UTILIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 46 (1974)
[hereinafter CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION REPORT].
73 Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15, at 623.
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although a partially centralized adjudicatory system would be a step
in the right direction, states that started with a partially centralized
office are now expanding and have determined that a completely
centralized system is far more advantageous.74 The ultimate
conclusion, therefore, is that a partially centralized adjudicatory
system would be an improvement, but that "a totally centralized
system seems far more advantageous for providing fundamentally fair
hearings."75
The mandate of the supreme court to remove even the appearance
of bias remains a great impediment to the administrative scheme in
Pennsylvania. The solution is quite simple: follow the lead of our
sister states and create a central panel system.76 As will be discussed
74 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR, STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN
HAWAII 11 (1991) [hereinafter HAWAII STUDY].
7 Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15, at 626 (emphasis added).
76 This solution seems all the more reasonable considering the vast number of
agencies that exist in Pennsylvania. The 1974 Mallamud and Carrow Study listed
27 different agencies. MALLAMUD & CARROW, supra note 23, at 6-73. In 1977
Cokin and Mallamud referred to 47 separate Pennsylvania agencies enumerated
in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-.51 (1962 & Supp. 1977-78) (repealed
1978). Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15, at 607 n. 12.
Section five of the Judiciary Act Repealer Act, Act of April 28, 1978, No.
53, 1978 Pa. Laws 202, replaced the Administrative Agency Law, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-.51. The scope of the new Administrative Agency Law
is set forth in subsection 501(a) of Title 2, which includes all Commonwealth
agencies (without listing) but excepts from the provisions in subsection 501(b)
proceedings before the following: Department of Revenue, Auditor General, or
Board of Finance and Revenue regarding taxes and interest; proceedings before
the Secretary of the Commonwealth under the Election Code; proceedings before
the Department of Transportation relating to appeals from government agencies;
and proceedings before the State System of Higher Education involving student
discipline. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 501(a), (b) (1995).
As of the date of publication, there are 27 Commonwealth departments and
commissions. They are the (1) Department of Aging; (2) Department of
Agriculture; (3) Department of the Auditor General; (4) Department of Banking;
(5) Department of Commerce; (6) Department of Community Affairs; (7)
Department of Conservation and Natural Resources; (8) Department of
Corrections; (9) Department of Education; (10) Department of Environmental
Protection; (11) Fish and Boat Commission; (12) Game Commission (13)
Department of General Services; (14) Department of Health; (15) Department of
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later in this Article, Pennsylvania's sister states have already proven
that such a system works and can provide a variety of benefits.77
III. EFFORTS TO CENTRALIZE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
Presently, the federal government has 1374 ALJs serving
approximately thirty agencies.78 By sheer number, the efforts to
centralize federal ALJs involves a bigger task than those efforts
initiated on the state level. Yet, despite this immensity, past and
present federal authorities have continued to push for a centralized
system.
A. Past and Present Efforts
The earliest use of authorities similar to ALJs began in 1789."9 Of
course, no one proclaimed violations of due process during this initial
use of administrative authority because the due process protection
Highways; (16) Historical and Museum Commission; (17) Human Relations
Commission; (18) Department of Insurance; (19) Department of Labor and
Industry; (20) Department of Military Affairs; (21) Public Utility Commission;
(22) Department of Public Welfare; (23) Department of Welfare; (24) Securities
Commission; (25) Department of State; (26) Department of Transportation; and
(27) Department of Treasury.
In addition, there are numerous boards and commissions that are statutorily
designated within the 27 departments and commissions. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, §§ 11-13 (1990).
11 For a discussion of state efforts to centralize, see infra notes 112-18 and
accompanying text.
78 Telephone Interview with Joyce Harrell, Federal Administrative Law Judges
Division (Feb. 28, 1996); see Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal
Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1343 n.6 (1992) (indicating
that on October 1, 1991, according to the Office of Personnel Management, there
were 1184 federal ALJs); Lubbers, supra note 5, at 276 (indicating that as of June
1981, there were 1119 federal AUs).
7911 For example, the military appointed officers to determine which "soldiers
were 'disabled during the late war,' . . . [and] customs officers who ... were
authorized to 'estimate the duties payable' on imports." 3 KENNETH C. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.11 (2d ed. 1980) (alteration in original).
These early appointments evidence that the federal government relied on
individuals with expertise in certain areas to provide just decisions.
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was in its infancy stage. It was not until the 1920s that the United
States Supreme Court examined the commingling of the
prosecutorial, investigative, and adjudicative functions within one
governmental body. Subsequently, the Court held it to be
inappropriate under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."° As a result, legislators introduced several bills in
Congress to create an administrative court. Unfortunately, World War
II delayed these attempts)"
President Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated comprehensive studies
in an attempt to eliminate the commingling of these three functions.8 2
In 1941 the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure submitted a report in which a majority of the committee
expressed concern that the use of a separate body to handle
administrative adjudication would result in decisions that are
inconsistent with agencies' mandates and policies. 3 In addition, the
committee was also concerned that such a system could either lead to
a breakdown of responsibility between an agency and the
adjudicatory body, or it could discourage negotiations and
settlements. 4 Consequently, the majority's report rejected a unified
administrative court.
A three-member minority, however, favored placing the
adjudicatory function either in one independent body or in several
specialized Article I courts. 8' The minority members concluded that
[h]earing and deciding officers cannot be wholly
independent so long as their appointments, assignments,
personnel records, and reputations are subject to control by
an authority which is also engaged in investigating and
prosecuting. Of course, this dependence may be diminished
I Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (holding that the mayor violated
due process of law when he acted as the chief executive in charge of the
investigation and as the presiding judge).
81 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 1.04 (1959).
82 EARL THOMAS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: THE CORPS ISSUE 19-21
(1987).
83 Id.
84 See id. at 20-21.
1 Id. at 21.
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by various devices, as the Committee has very rightly
attempted. We think it clear, however, that such dependents
[sic] cannot be eliminated by measures short of complete
segregation into independent agencies.16
Congress ultimately incorporated the majority's recommendations
into the Federal Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.87 However,
had the minority's report prevailed, a system similar to what Congress
is considering today might be in place. 8
Despite this initial rejection, authorities in the field have
continuously supported a unified corps of ALJs appointed and
employed by an authority separate from agencies. The Hoover
Commission Report proposed a unified corps in 1955,89 and in 1974
a federal advisory committee proposed a study of the corps idea.9°
Furthermore, former ABA President Bernard G. Segal9 and President
Gerald Ford's Solicitor General, Robert H. Bork,92 advocated the
unified corps in 1976 and 1977, respectively. In 1981, two renowned
political science experts, Ronald Marquardt and Edward M. Wheat,
argued for a unified corps. 3 From 1983 to 1989, Senator Arlen
Specter supported the Heflin Bill.94 In 1993, a new Heflin Bill was
86 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1941).
87 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, Pub. L. No. 46-404, 60
Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
88 THOMAS, supra note 82, at 20-21. For a discussion of the Heflin Bill and
the Gekas Bill, see infra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
89 COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT REPORT, H. DOC. No. 128, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-64 (1955).
90 Palmer & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 679.
91 Segal, supra note 3, at 1426.
9 President Ford directed Solicitor General Robert H. Bork to head a
committee to study the needs of the federal judiciary system. State of the
Judiciary and Access to Justice Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 243-44 (1977).
93 Ronald Marquardt & Edward M. Wheat, The Developing Concept of an
Administrative Court, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 301, 317-21 (1981).
1 S. 826, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (sponsored by Senator Howell Heflin,
former Chief Judge of Alabama).
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introduced and approved by the Senate on November 19, 1993. 91
Despite years of action, the federal unified corps concept was in
limbo until June 8, 1995, when Congressman George Gekas
introduced House Bill 1802, a bill almost identical to the Heflin Bill,
calling for the centralization of federal administrative law judges.96
B. A History of the Heflin Bill
The previous Heflin Bill and the new Gekas Bill have two
primary purposes: first, to remove ALJs from the supervision and
control of the agencies that employ them and, second, to establish an
independent, unified corps of ALJs.97 To achieve these goals, the
initial 1983 version of the Heflin Bill9" devised an organizational
s. 486, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
96 H.R. 1802, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Congress reviewed other
recommendations. The Joint Congressional Committee of the Congress, at the
request of the Joint Office of Personnel Management,
agreed to do a study of what is referred to as "The Changing Role of
Administrative Law Judges in Federal Agency Adjudication." The
agreement was entered into March 1, 1991, [for completion by June,
19921 .... Significantly, the agreement ... provides for a study of
the increasing tendency of federal agencies to depart from the
Administrative Procedures Act . . ., by using [ALls] less and by
relying on the use of nonadministrative law judge employees of the
agency to hear adjudications more and more.
Charles N. Bono, Another Study of Federal ALJs: The Never-Ending Story,
A.B.A. JUDGES' J., Winter 1992, at 23. A draft report was issued May 26, 1992,
and a final report with recommendations was submitted on December 10-11,
1992. COMMITTEE ON ADJUDICATION, PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION: THE
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 1 (Dec. 10-11, 1992). There are some
recommendations and suggestions to repeal existing protective provisions of the
APA that insulate ALJs from improper agency pressure. Id. at 13. Additionally,
agencies would be given authority to evaluate and rank AUs' performances, and
to grant awards, commendations, and bonuses to those ALIs who please the
agency. Id. at 15. Also, an agency would be given a large list of new, minimally
qualified AUs from which it could select those individuals that the agency most
wanted to be its independent adjudicator. Id. at 14.
97 See 129 CONG. REC. S6609-10 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of
Senator Heflin).
91 S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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structure that called for "not more than ten but not less than four
divisions" of "corps," and specifically divided the "corps" into "seven
divisions reflecting areas of specialization."99 These divisions
included the following: "(1) Division of Communications, Public
Utility and Transportation Regulation; (2) Division of Health, Safety
and Environmental Regulation; (3) Division of Labor; (4) Division
of Labor Relations; (5) Division of Benefits Programs; (6) Division
of Securities, Commodities and Trade Regulation; [and] (7) Division
of General Programs and Grants."' l0
In response to the savings and loan crisis, the 1991 version of the
Heflin Bill"0' added one more division, the Division of Financial
Services Institutions.0 2 The new Gekas Bill of June 5, 1995, is almost
identical to the 1991 and 1993 Heflin Bills and provides the
following: (1) each division would have a chief judge but no longer
requires that the judge have a minimum of five years of experience as
the Heflin Bills required;0 3 (2) the chief judge of the corps and those
of the respective divisions would be appointed by the President with
the "advice and consent of the Senate" for a five-year term;'°4 except
five of the first division chief judges who shall have shorter initial
terms;0 5 (3) the chiefjudges would comprise the policy-making body
of the corps known as the council of the corps;0 6 (4) the council
would have authority to appoint, 0 7 assign, reassign, or transfer other
judges;'0 8 to prescribe rules and procedur&; and generally to
99 Michel Levant, A Unified Corps of Administrative Law Judges-The
Transition from a Conce,' to an Eventual Reality, W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 705,
707 (1984) (citing S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989)).
100Id.
... S. 826, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
102 Id. § 598(b)8.
103 H.R. 1802, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 599(a) (1995); see S. 486, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 598(c)(2) (1993); S. 826, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 598(c)(2)
(1991).
1o H.R. 1802 § 599(a), 599a(c)(1); see S. 486 § 597(a); S. 826 § 597(a).
1 0 H.R. 1802 § 599a(c)(2); see S. 486 § 598(c)(3); S. 826 § 598(c)(3).
1 6 H.R. 1802 § 599b(a); see S. 486 § 599(a); S. 826 § 599(a).
107 H.R. 1802 § 599b(d)(2); see S. 486 § 599(d)(2); S. 826 § 599(d)(2).
108 H.R. 1802 § 599b(d)(1); see S. 486 § 599(d)(1); S. 826 § 599(d)(1).
109 H.R. 1802 § 599b(d)(4); see S. 486 § 599(d)(4); S. 826 § 599(d)(4).
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govern the corps' affairs and operations as a collegial council."0
Congress is still debating over the exact structure to be
implemented, but as can be seen by the renewed interest, a federal
central panel system appears to be forthcoming. The scheduling of a
debate on the Gekas Bill before the Judiciary Committee of both
Houses is imminent."1
IV. EFFORTS TO CENTRALIZE ON THE STATE LEVEL
Many of the sister states of Pennsylvania have had tremendous
success in developing central panel systems. "2 These states have
proven that the overall effect on individual state agencies has been
one of efficiency, effectiveness, and improved quality.
Pennsylvania is in the fortunate position to be able to review the
structure and results achieved by these central panel states. The
variety of items addressed by each state, such as the number of
hearing officers, the average annual caseload, the locations
throughout the state, funding sources, rules of procedure, and
qualifications and salaries of hearing officers, are set forth in
Appendix A to assist the Pennsylvania General Assembly. The
empirical data summarized in Appendix A reveals that a central panel
system can achieve tremendous results. In addition to these empirical
results, the states now enjoy other benefits, all of which are attainable
if Pennsylvania adopts a central panel system.
110 H.R. 1802 § 599b(d)(5)-(13); see S. 486 § 599(d)(5)-(13); S. 826
§ 599(d)(5)-(13).
"I Telephone Interview with Congressman George Gekas, United States
House of Representatives (Aug. 15, 1995). The Author reconfirmed this point
with a member of Congressman Gekas' staff on January 31, 1996. Furthermore,
it should be noted that the American Bar Association supported the adoption of
the Heflin Bill. Letter from Diane Livingston, Staff Director, ABA, to Joanie
Work, Administrative Officer (Aug. 31, 1989) (on file with author) (confirming
endorsement by the ABA House of Delegates).
"I For example, Maryland increased the number of cases that the AUs hear
to 77,000, while reducing the number of ALJs. In addition to the states, New
York City also centralized its administrative adjudication. New York's
centralization increased efficiency by computerizing case tracking, electronically
recording hearings, and computerizing case scheduling. See infra Appendix A.
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Once established, a centralized panel structure will provide the
Commonwealth with six very important benefits. First, a centralized
system will guarantee, and be perceived by the public as
guaranteeing, the impartiality of ALJs as fact-finders. "3 Second, this
system will improve the quality of hearings and decisions. "14 Third,
such a scheme will place the management and training of all ALJs in
the hands of experienced officials whose understanding and
appreciation of the duties and responsibilities of the office come from
their actual performance of such duties and responsibilities.I 5 Fourth,
many in-house staff and part-time outside personnel will no longer be
required." 6 Fifth, a reduction of overall costs will be realized! 7
Sixth, an experienced, government-wide, politically insulated, career
service would attract quality individuals. I"
A. Guaranteeing Impartiality
A fundamental goal of those developing state central panel
systems has been to give ALJs a certain amount of independence
from the agencies over whose proceedings they preside." 9 As of
1981, seven state central panel systems set out to achieve the basic
goal of separating ALJs from the agencies that they served. 2 ° Each
state, however, did so in a different way, adapting to unique political
and economic considerations.' 2' These seven states included
California (1945), Colorado (1976), Florida (1974), Massachusetts
(1974), Minnesota (1976), New Jersey (1979), and Tennessee
(1974).122
113 Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15, at 626.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 626-27.
17 Id. at 641.
" Id. at 627.
".. Malcolm Rich, Adapting the Central Panel System: A Study of Seven
States, 65 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'v 246, 246 (1981).
120 Id. at 247.
121 Id. at 248.
12 Id. at 249.
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One impetus for creating a central "pool" of hearing officers, at
least in Florida, Massachusetts, and Minnesota, "was displeasure
among [the] legislatures with agency 'rule-making by fiat."' , 3 It
should be noted that after surveying the ALJs in these states regarding
independence, more than half supported separation from their
respective agencies.1
24
The other states, summarized in Appendix A, also had to consider
the problem of impartiality. Each state had to decide how to separate
the adjudicatory and prosecutory functions effectively. For example,
the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), in its report
on its first decade, 1975 to 1985, stated that the central hearing office
served as an independent and impartial buffer for the administrative
process.'25 This buffer also eliminated the conflict of administrators
trying to be impartial adjudicators while maintaining a close
relationship with members of the regulated industry in an attempt to
keep abreast of current events within the industry.
In 1988 the Final Report of the Governor's Task Force on
Administrative Hearing Officers, recommending a central panel
system for Maryland, provided as follows:
Having Hearing Officers assigned to a Central Panel would
better indicate to the citizens and business community of
Maryland that they would in fact receive an impartial and
unbiased adjudication of their appeal. The Administrative
Law Judges would not be dependent upon the agency-party
for continued employment, salary, promotions, benefits,
office space, parking permits, etc., and would not be subject
to retribution or 'control' via a diminution of those items. 26
In 1990 the Hawaii Legislature began its own foray into mapping
"I' Id. (quoting Telephone Interview with Duane R. Harves, Chief
Administrative Law Judge in Minnesota (September 1980)).
124 Id. at 250.
125 DUANE R. HARVES, THE STATE OF MINNESOTA OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 1975-1985: A REPORT ON THE FIRST DECADE 57
(1986).
t26 FINAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARING OFFICERS 18 (June 28, 1988) Ihereinafter GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCEI.
For the text of the report, see infra Appendix B.
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out a central panel system. Initially, it requested that the Auditor of
Hawaii study the extent of administrative adjudication in the state. 12 7
In particular, it asked whether placing all hearing officers into a
separate state office would promote efficiency and the appearance of
impartiality in decision-making. 2 s The auditor summarized the study
as follows:
We explored the issue of whether separating hearing officers
from their agencies and organizing them into a "central
panel" would increase their independence, improve
efficiency and make the process appear more fair....
We believe that a central panel will enhance the appearance
of fairness and lead to more confidence in government.2 9
The auditor also surveyed the administrators of central panels in
other states and reported that "[a]ll states cited improvements in
impartiality and fairness. The comments ranged from Colorado's
'tremendous' to Florida's 'improved.' Tennessee said that the
increased perception of impartiality and fairness by the public and the
bar has been one of the most prominent and satisfying benefits."'3 °
The auditor's report recommended that Hawaii conduct a pilot test of
suitable agencies to test the concept of a central panel and to evaluate
the results.' 3 ' By January 1992, the Governor of Hawaii designated
the Office of Administrative Hearings, Department of Commerce and
Consumer Affairs, to be the Pilot Central Panel for the State of
Hawaii.32
327 HAWAII STUDY, supra note 74, at 1.
128 Id. (citing S. Con. Res. 169, S.D. 1 (1990) (enacted)).
129 Id. at i.
130 Id. at 11.
"I Id. at 22.
132 Rodney A. Maile, State of the States: Hawaii, CENT. PANEL (Newsletter
of the Central Panel States, Lutherville, Md.), Spring 1993, at 2. Five years ago,
the Auditor of the State of Hawaii completed a legislative study on the
administrative adjudication process, with particular attention paid to the
desirability of creating a central panel of hearing adjudicators. The report,
released in February 1991, recommended the legislature ask the governor to
establish a task force with the responsibility of initiating, planning,
implementing, and evaluating the pilot test of the central panel concept. HAWAII
STUDY, supra note 74, at 31.
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Similarly, Pennsylvania initially recognized a need for
impartiality. The 1974 study of adjudicatory hearings in
Pennsylvania, completed by Jonathan Mallamud and Milton M.
Carrow, concluded that Pennsylvania needed fair and impartial
hearings. 33 The committee recommended that a central office be
established to provide hearing officers for administrative agency
adjudications.3 4 Such a central office would "offer the best
opportunity for creating an independent group of hearing officers who
could conduct fair hearings and, thereby, help to increase
substantially public confidence in government." 3 Finally, the study
also brought to light the need for independent hearing officers to
appear fair.
136
'33 MALLAMUD & CARROW, supra note 23, at 91-92.
134 Id. at 113.
135 Id. This study further provided as follows:
The complete central office would have the best chance of creating an
attractive career service capable of obtaining highly qualified people to
become professional hearing officers. At the same time the central
office would be able to assist such people to become experts in various
substantive areas without sacrificing their independence. In my opinion,
formed after considering the alternatives, a central office would have
the best opportunity to increase the quality of administrative hearings
on a continuing basis, while insuring that those conducting the hearings
develop a sufficient understanding of the various substantive areas to
insure a fair application of agency policy as well as a fair determination
of the facts of each case with sufficient independence to protect the
rights of private parties.
Id. at 113-14.
136 Id. at 94-95. The authors also made the point that the
hearing officer should be independent enough to be able to make a fair
evaluation of past agency policy in an effort to achieve a fair decision
without feeling the need to decide all open questions in favor of the
agency. In considering the question of independence it is also necessary
to remember that not only must the decision be fair in fact, but that the
appearance of fairness may be crucial. One purpose of affording parties
fair hearings is to achieve fair results; another purpose is to instill
confidence in the fairness of the decision-making process. Both are
important and although a decision may be fair, if it appears that an
agency exercises control over a particular decision of
the hearing offices, outside of the on-the-record proceedings, the parties will not
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B. Improving the Quality of the Hearing Process
The various central panel system states also recognized the need
to increase the management, training, and quality of their hearing
officials. The programs implemented by these states demonstrate the
diverse ways in which the hearing process can be improved. For
example, Minnesota implemented "a formal training program which
include[d] training in areas of substantive law such as workers'
compensation, discrimination law, [and] public utilities regulation."137
As a result, the number of cases received for disposition increased
from 4,620 cases in 1989 to 10,783 cases in 1995.138
Both California and Colorado embraced the concept of total
quality management. In particular, Colorado developed a
computerized case-tracking system that significantly reduces delays
in scheduled hearings from 264 days to 82 days.'39 The Colorado
Legislative Audit Committee praised the division involved for doing
more with less. 140 In addition, California consulted with officials in
Colorado in its attempt to accomplish total quality management
control. 141
In response to a state budget crisis in 1991, the North Carolina
feel that the decision is fair. The basic idea is to make hearing officers sufficiently
independent to make factual determinations uninfluenced by outcome-oriented
institutional pressures, and to resolve open policy questions fairly, in harmony
with previous agency determinations but also taking into account the arguments
of the parties so that they can feel that they received a fair hearing. This goal
applies both where hearing officers make decisions subject to appeal and where
hearing officers merely make findings and recommendations for the determination
of the agency head.
Id. at 95 (citation omitted).
137 See HARVES, supra note 125, at 58.
138 Telephone Interview with Sandy Haven, Assistant to the Honorable Kevin
Johnson, Chief Administrative Law Judge in Minnesota (Feb. 14, 1996).
3 Edwin L. Felter, Jr., State of the States: Colorado, CENT. PANEL
(Newsletter of the Central Panel States, Lutherville, Md.), Spring 1993, at 1-2.
140 Id. at 1.
14 Karl S. Engeman, State of the States: California, CENT. PANEL (Newsletter
of the Central Panel States, Lutherville, Md.), Spring 1993, at 2.
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Legislature created the Government Performance Audit Committee. 42
The purpose of the committee was to check for poor management,
waste, and inefficiency in executive branch agencies. The Speaker of
the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, along with
influential legislators and other public officials, made up the
committee. 43 The audit staff found that, at times, some agencies
arbitrarily rejected an AL's recommended decision when doing so
served the interests of the agencies. 144 Because of efficiency and the
quality of the decisions, the committee recommended that the AL's
decisions be final. 45
C. Improving Management and Training Programs
Maryland, on the other hand, focused on improving its ALJs by
implementing a comprehensive training program. The Maryland
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) established a training
program to prepare each AU for certification in various areas of
administrative law. 46 The plan was structured to train all ALJs in
OAH priority areas and to train a select few ALJs in other subject
areas."' A quality assurance director monitors the training plan for
each AU, targeting training to OAH priorities and ALJs' interests.148
The evaluation of an AL's performance is based in part on his
progress during the training process. Initial training programs provide
an overview of selected subjects, and less experienced ALJs are
required to observe cases as they are heard by experienced ALJs.1
49
142 Julian Mann, III, State of the States: North Carolina, CENT. PANEL
(Newsletter of the Central Panel States, Lutherville, Md.), Spring 1993, at 5. The
six states referred to above experienced the type of favorable results that central
panel states enjoyed. See also Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State
Central Panels in the 1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 75 (1994) (discussing the central
panel systems in Maryland, North Dakota, and Texas).
141 Mann, supra note 142, at 5.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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The ALJs are certified by the OAH upon completion of their course
xx jrk. Mock trials, videotaping, written course work, and subject
matter courses, such as rules of evidence, are offered to ensure
continuing education. This is similar to the "training programs
provided by other central panel states." I5
To ensure the completeness of this training program, the Chief
ALJ of Maryland does the following: develops a code of professional
responsibility for ALJs, monitors the quality of administrative
hearings, and submits an annual report on the activities of the
office."' The Chief ALJ receives assistance from a state advisory
council and is responsible for making policy and evaluating
performances.'52 In fact, Maryland was the first state to implement an
advisory council in order to provide a critique of its central panel
system. In January 1992, an audit by the Maryland Department of
Budget and Fiscal Planning pointed out that performance evaluations
of ALJs are separated from the agencies by a ten-member Judicial
Performance and Evaluation Committee. 53 This committee consisted
of two five-member panels that utilized standardized protocols and
rating forms which focused on an ALJ's abilities to preside, write, and
progress in training. 54
Maryland recognized several benefits from the reorganization of
its ALJs and the ALJ training program. To begin, while reducing
costs due to a budget cut, the OAH experienced a ten percent increase
in its case load to over 74,000 cases with about 59,000 hearings.'55
Furthermore, the office heard more complex cases arising from a
greater number of agencies than it was originally structured to hear.'56
At the same time, the office did not experience an increase in the
"50 STATE OF MARYLAND: DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET & FISCAL PLANNING,
MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 9 (1992)
[hereinafter MANAGEMENT REVIEW].
151 MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 9-1604 (1993).
I52Id. § 9-1610 (1993). North Dakota replicated this approach with respect to
visibility and accountability. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-57-08 (1991).
' MANAGEMENT REVIEW, supra note 150, at 12-13.
154 Id.
'55 Id. at 27.
156 Id. at 13.
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average backlog of cases.'
D. Reducing Staff
States adopting a central panel system experienced a huge
reduction of staff. In North Dakota, for example, "[a]pproximately
one year after the establishment of the Administrative Hearing
Officer Division, only a few state agencies continued to maintain
full-time and part-time hearing officers. ' "' Therefore, "[t]he
remainder of the state's agencies, boards, and commissions almost
exclusively used the services of the Administrative Hearing Officer
Division."'159
Tennessee enjoyed similar success. The legislature originally
created the Tennessee Administrative Procedures Division "to
provide hearing officers only for regulatory boards, [such as those in]
the Department of Health and the Department of Commerce and
Insurance."' 6 ° However, because of the division's success and good
reputation over the years, many more agencies voluntarily elected to
do the same. "I
Maryland also experienced a reduction from ninety ALJs prior to
adopting a central system to seventy-seven in 1990. By 1995 there
were only fifty-nine full-time and three part-time ALJs.I62 In addition,
from 1990 to 1992, there was a corresponding reduction of staff from
135 to 115 individuals.'63 Colorado also demonstrated a similar
reduction in staff after implementing a total quality management
" John W. Hardwicke, State of the States: Maryland, CENT. PANEL
(Newsletter of the Central Panel States, Lutherville, Md.), Spring 1993, at 3.
"38 Hoberg, supra note 142, at 84.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 78.
161 Id.
162 Telephone Interview with Bernice Verner, Assistant to the Honorable John
W. Hardwicke, Chief Administrative Law Judge in Maryland (February 7, 1996).
163 John W. Hardwicke, State of the States: Maryland, CENT. PANEL
(Newsletter of the Central Panel States, Lutherville, Md.), Spring 1993, at 3.
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program. " In 1988 the central panel system in New Jersey employed
only forty-three full-time ALJs with 2.5 support staff members per
judge, as compared to the previous 136 hearing examiners. 65 The
Minnesota Department of Commerce reduced its total staff by forty




Other cost-saving measures can be realized in addition to the
savings associated with a reduction in staff. Many of the central panel
states, such as Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Tennessee, and
Wisconsin, became more efficient and realized economic benefits as
a consequence of central computerization.'67 Since the inception of its
central panel system in 1979, New Jersey experienced a continuous
and dramatic reduction of costs. 68
11 See Karl S. Engeman, State of the States: Colorado, CENT. PANEL
(Newsletter of the Central Panel States, Lutherville, Md.), Summer 1992, at 2-3.
161 GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 126, at 23. In addition, the Chief
AL of New Jersey estimated that had the old system remained in place, the cost
to New Jersey would have been $20 million compared to the then cost of $7.5
million. Id.
11 Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S. 1275 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 n.11 (1983) [hereinafter ALJ Corps Act Hearings]
(statement of the Honorable Howard Kestin, Chief Administrative Law Judge for
the State of New Jersey).
16' See State of the States, CENT. PANEL (Newsletter of the Central Panel
States, Lutherville, Md.), Summer 1993, at 1-4, 6-7.
The California central panel of AUs, noted and widely respected for fairness
and skill, did not have one decision rejected in the past year, despite the fact that
each agency head had the authority to reject any AU decision and substitute a
new one. These changes are estimated to have saved California $800,000 in costs
and $2 million "in party litigation costs." Letter from Professor Michael Asimow,
Professor of Law, School of Law at.the University of California, Los Angeles,
to Neil R. Eisner, Chairman of the Outstanding Government Service Award
Committee (Apr. 8, 1993), in NEIL EISNER ET AL., REPORT OF THE OUTSTANDING
GOVERNMENT SERVICE AWARD COMMITTEE (1993) (on file with the Author).
'
68ALJ Corps Act Hearings, supra note 166, at 9-10.
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According to Chief Judge Duane R. Harves, the creation of the
centralized Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings dramatically
decreased hearing costs and turnaround time in issuing decisions,
while at the same time increasing efficiency.'69 Chief Judge Harves'
statistics revealed a reduction of hearing costs for the Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission from $400,000 in fiscal year 1976 to
$311,330 in fiscal year 1977, and to $184,219 for fiscal year 1982.170
Other agencies experienced similar savings, such as the Minnesota
Department of Commerce, which reduced its hearing costs from
$120,000 to $60,000 in fiscal year 1982.171 Similarly, in late 1994 the
Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings reported a 70%
reduction in the cost of its hearing proceedings.
72
F. Attracting Experienced and Politically Insulated
Career Professionals
Jonathan Mallamud and Milton Carrow, in a 1975 study and
report to the Pennsylvania Department of Justice, indicated that a
central office would increase the potential for career development.1
73
As the system works now, hearing officers conduct hearings in only
a single agency. According to the study, more individuals would
pursue a career as an ALJ in a centralized system because they would
have the opportunity to work in a variety of agencies throughout the
state.'74 This variety would combat the boredom that judges who
continuously preside over the same issues face, thus having "the
169 Duane R. Harves, The Minnesota Experience, MD. BAR J., Dec. 1986, at
18.
170 Id. at 11.
"I Harves, supra note 9, at 263. Maryland also experienced cost savings
associated with its central panel system, In 1993, that state reduced its budget
from $7.7 million to $6.7 million-achieving a reduction in money spent while
increasing the number and complexity of cases, and decreasing the backlog of
cases. John W. Hardwicke, State of the States: Maryland, CENT. PANEL
(Newsletter of the Central Panel States, Lutherville, Md.), Spring 1993, at 3.
172 Texas: Developments in the States, THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY NEWS
AND JOURNAL, Winter 1994, at 1, 7.
173 MALLAMUD & CARROW, supra note 23, at 110.
114 Id. at 121-22.
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added benefit of attracting more members of the bar to pursue the
career of administrative law judge."175
Mallamud and Carrow discussed other benefits associated with
the implementation of a central panel system. Their study indicated
the following:
If the career were viewed as a career in fair decision-making,
a quasi-judicial career, it would very likely attract people
with very high qualifications who would not work as a
hearing officer now, except perhaps on a part-time basis. At
the same time, the creation of an administrative hearing
service might lead to the development of a group of
independent decision-makers within the administrative
structure who would have the type of independence and
respect now associated only with the judiciary. 76
The authors then argued that if the previous assertion was true, the
public would have more confidence in the government "and it might
enable the government, through the use of fair hearings, to carry out
its policies in sensitive areas more easily than it can now."'
1 77
The Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings may have the
broadest jurisdiction and largest caseload of administrative hearings
of any central panel agency in any state. It has been referred to as the
"vanguard" in the central panel system. 178 In fact, after only eighteen
months of operation, the Maryland Department of Budget and Fiscal
Planning commended the Maryland OAH "for successfully
consolidating a large number of disparate hearing units into a
professional, well managed new agency. Management systems for
quality assurance, case docketing, hearing scheduling and training for
Administrative Law Judges ... are either in place or in planning. The
agency clearly has the potential for achieving excellence."'1
79
The prior discussion of these six factors demonstrates that the
"Is THOMAS, supra note 82, at 15-16.
176 MALLAMUD & CARROW, supra note 23, at 121.
177 Id.
171 Hoberg, supra note 142, at 83; see also Appendix A (providing a list of
these figures for the central panel states in Table 1).
79 MANAGEMENT REVIEW, supra note 150, at i.
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central panel states experienced problems, similar to those that
Pennsylvania is currently experiencing, with their respective
adjudicatory processes, and that these states chose to implement
various types of central panel systems to rectify these problems. Most
importantly, not one state that adopted a central panel system has
reverted back to its previous fragmented hearing process.
Additionally, most of these state panel systems experienced increased
acceptance, expansion in use, uniformity of rules, improved
efficiency, and overall cost reduction.
V. PENNSYLVANIA SHOULD ADOPT A UNIFIED ADJUDICATORY
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Pennsylvania can and should adopt a central panel system to
effectively carry out the administrative adjudicatory function. So long
as accountability is retained within the respective administrative
agencies, a central panel system has the potential to increase the
overall effectiveness of the administrative adjudicatory process in
Pennsylvania.
As with any other proposed reform, the centralized or unified
system is not without its adversaries. The following concerns exist
regarding the creation of an independent, centralized-adjudicatory
agency: (1) the judges' experience with, and the necessary
understanding of the policies of the agency; (2) the format of the
central adjudicatory agency, including its scope and authority; and (3)
the finality of agency decisions.' Although each of these concerns
is valid, they do not outweigh the benefits associated with a central
adjudicatory system. The consensus of a majority of those individuals
within the legal community utilizing a unified system is that such a
system is efficient and increases the quality of hearings and
decisions.'
180 See HARVES, supra note 125, at 57; Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15, at
618-22; Palmer & Bernstein, supra note 3, at 693-703.
1I HARVES, supra note 125, at 57; Cokin & Mallainud, supra note 15, at
606; Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Colorado's Central Panel of ALJs: The Hidden
Executive Branch Judiciary, COLO. LAW., July 1990, at 1308; Allen L. Tapley,
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A centralized adjudicatory agency with a sufficient number of
ALJs would provide all administrative agencies with the necessary
resources to properly adjudicate matters within their jurisdiction.
Such consolidation would afford economies of scale in terms of
eliminating duplication of hearing facilities, law libraries, and support
staffs, and would secure maximum benefits from computerized
docketing and scheduling systems. Regarding the concern that
experience and insight are needed to effectively adjudicate agency
matters, the following will assist the hearing officer. First, a central
system will attract more highly qualified individuals than does the
present system. Second, by utilizing a specialized training program
and assigning cases to experienced hearing officers, it is reasonable
to expect that the high degree of skill necessary to adequately address
the varied and complex matters that often arise will be achieved.
Third, to assist them in their adjudicative functions, the centralized
ALJs would be able to rely on law clerks' research and the litigants'
briefs, just as the Pennsylvania judiciary does in its adjudications. All
of this will be accomplished while maintaining the degree of
impartiality necessary to increase overall judicialization of the
administrative process.
Critics of the central panel system are also concerned with
funding for this type of system. The central panel states use two
mechanisms to finance the central office of hearing officers: (1)
appropriations of general funds; and (2) the imposition of user fees.I 2
In Pennsylvania the central office could receive its own budget from
the General Appropriations Fund. This method of appropriation
would eliminate the detailed process of assessing appropriations for
the various state agencies. The expenses could be borne entirely by
the agencies using the central office services on a charge back system.
In 1977 the Pennsylvania Department of Justice estimated that
state agencies expended approximately ten million dollars on the
hearing process in Pennsylvania.'83 As noted earlier in this Article,
Letters: The Success of Unification, 65 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 232, 232, 278
(1981).
1"2 See infra Appendix A.
183 Cokin & Mallamud, supra note 15, at 640-41 n.138.
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many states have experienced a decrease in costs as a result of their
use of a centralized panel system.' Even if the use of a central office
resulted in only minimal cost decreases, or perhaps even increased
costs, these costs would be offset by the increases in the quality and
fairness of the total administrative agency hearing process.
The centralized panel system is an attractive and necessary step.
Once established, a centralized panel structure will reduce partiality,
costs, and staff; attract experienced hearing officers; and improve the
quality of the hearing process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The present system for applying administrative law in an
adjudicatory hearing in Pennsylvania is fragmented and often fails to
provide the basic appearance of fairness and impartiality. There is a
nationwide movement to increase the "judicialization" of the
administrative adjudicatory process and to make changes that increase
the economic benefit to government. To date, twenty-two states have
implemented some form of a centralized panel system, and the results
have been extremely favorable.' 5 Therefore, it should be abundantly
clear that the governor of Pennsylvania or the Pennsylvania
Legislature should appoint a task force to study this movement, as did
the governor of Maryland in 1988s6
Convinced that significant dissatisfaction existed regarding the
administrative hearing process in Maryland, the governor appointed
a task force to examine the system. He specifically charged the task
force to determine the following:
I. Is there a need to create a centralized system of
184 For a discussion of reduced state costs, see supra notes 167-73 and
accompanying text.
185 For a table of the states that use the central panel system, see infra
Appendix A.
186 Analyzing the impact that unification would have on each agency would be
a multifarious project. In order to have a complete and comprehensive evaluation
regarding each state agency, it will be necessary to have a study performed with
input obtained from members of the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee,
and the Joint State Government Commission.
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administrative hearing officers, as has been done in a number
of States? If so, how should the centralized system be
structured and financed? 2. If a centralized system of
administrative hearing officers is not needed, what specific
changes should be made to Maryland's current system of
selecting and using administrative hearing officers? 3. What
qualifications and training should be required of
administrative hearing officers? 4. What procedures should
be instituted to insure that the most qualified people are
hired and retained as administrative hearing officers? 5. How
should the performance of the administrative hearing officers
and the overall process of administrative hearings be
evaluated? 6. What specific procedures should be adopted to
insure that the administrative hearing process is consistent
throughout the State?" 7
The final report of the Maryland task force has been included as
187 GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 126, at 24-28 (responses omitted).
The task force overwhelmingly concluded the following: First, it was "necessary
to create a centralized system of Administrative Law Judges ... organized into
one independent office within the Executive Department," with a Chief Judge,
appropriate assistants, and financed as the existing units within Maryland; second,
"given the breadth of the problems noted," the task force "strongly Ibelieved] that
the better course of action would be to adopt the central panel concept" over other
alternative changes to the existing system; third, as the minimum requirements for
professional adjudicators, the administrative law judges must have membership
in the Bar, with preference for experience in administrative hearings; fourth, "the
administrative law judge cadre [should] be hired in unclassified service,"
dismissed only for cause, and have assurance of job tenure; fifth, "[tihe Chief
[AU] should be . . . responsible for ensuring the efficient and effective
performance" and processing of hearings subject to occasional legislative audit;
sixth, all hearing units should be merged into one independent office headed by
the Chief ALJ; and seventh, the task force further recommended the development
of "one set of procedural regulations that would uniformly apply to the hearing
of contested cases throughout all of the executive agencies." Id.; see infra
Appendix B.
As a result of the favorable report of the task force, Maryland established a
central "Office of Administrative Hearings" with AUs as of January 1, 1990.
MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 9-1602 (1995); Exec. Order No.
01.01.1989.21.
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Appendix B. The Pennsylvania legislature can draw from it during
any deliberations that may arise if Pennsylvania pursues a study of a
central panel system.
It is my hope that the data accumulated, set forth, and discussed
in this Article will serve as a source of guidance and inspiration to
encourage Pennsylvania to adopt a central panel system. At a time
when the Commonwealth is attempting to limit costs while improving
services, there has never been a more opportune time to investigate
and propose a central panel system. By implementing a central panel
system, Pennsylvania has everything to gain and nothing to lose.
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APPENDIX Al8
CENTRAL PANEL STATES SURVEY 1992: TABLE 1
"I8 Central Panel System Survey, SUMMARY OF CENTRAL PANEL STATES'
ACTvrriEs FOR THE 1992 CENTRAL PANEL CONFERENCE, October 1992, at tables
1, 2. As of 1992, 15 states and New York City had established a central panel
hearing system. Iowa was one of the 15 central panel state in existence in 1992,
however, Iowa is not included in this chart because it did not participate in the
study conducted by those attending the 1992 Central Panel Conference. In
addition, as of 1992, Hawaii had undertaken a two-year pilot program and was
considering permanently implementing a central panel system. As of the date of
publication, seven additional states had established a central panel hearing system.
Schoenbaum, supra note 1. These states included: Texas, Wyoming, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Georgia, Kentucky, and Louisiana. See table 4,
Appendix A. In addition, as of the date of publication, six states and the District
of Columbia had introduced legislation providing for the establishment of a central
panel system. Schoenbaum, supra note 1.
STATE PLACE IN LOCATION NUMBER OF AVERAGE
GOVERNMENT HEARING OFFICERS ANNUAL
CASELOAD
CAL. Executive Regional 39 Full Time 6,000
Branch Offices
COLO. Executive Regional 10 Full Time 13,100Branch Offices 7 Part Time
FLA. Executive Central 30 Full Time 5,000Branch Office
Executive Central Chief/Deputy
MD. AJs Plus 77,000Branch Office56FlTie ______56 Full Time
MASS. Executive Central 8 Full Time 1,300Branch Office
Executive Central 25 Full Time
MINN. Branch25 Part Time 10,50027 Workers' Comp._
Mo. Executive Central 2 Full Time 2,000Branch Office 1 Vacancy
N.J. Executive Regional 45 Full Time 11,000Branch Offices
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Central 7 Full Time
N.Y. CITY Executive Office 4 Vacancies
STATE PLACE IN LOCATION NUMBER OF AVERAGE
GOVIERNMENT IEARING OFFICERS ANNUALCASEILOAD
Executive Central Chief AIJ Plus 1,400
Branch Office 8 Full Time ,40 .
Executive Central Director Plus 60)
ND. Branch Office 3 Full Time
Secretary of Central Chief AU Plus 1068
TENN. State Office 8 Full Time
Executive Regional 59 Full Time 42,0
WeBranch Offices I Part Time
Wi. Department of Central Office 12 Full Time 3,6(X)
Wls. Admfinistration with Satellites . . . .. ..
Indepen~dent
Wy. Agency inl Regional 3 Full Time 5,500
Wv. Executive Offices 8 PartTimne
Branch ,,., ..
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CENTRAL PANEL STATES SURVEY 1992: TABLE 2
STATE 1 FUNDING ANNUAL RULES OF CODE OF TYPE OF
SOURCES BUDGET PROCEDUREj ETHICS DECISION
Canons of Recommended
CAL. User Fees $ 9 Million APA Ethics for & Final
Attorneys
COLO. User Fees $ 1.3 Million Own Judicial Code Recommendedof Ethics
Judicial Code
of Ethics & Recommended
FLA. User Fees $ 4.9 Million APA Atres & FinlAttorney's & Final
Code of Ethics
General & $ 6.7 Million Recommended
MD. Reimbursable (FY 1993) APA Own & Final
Funds $473000 Canons of Recommended
MASS. General Fund $ 1992) APA Ethics for & Final(FY )Attorneys
User Fees &
Workers' Recommended
MINN. $ 5 Million Own OwnCompensation & Final
Appropriation
General Fund Attorneys'Mo. $ 650,000 APA Canons of Final& User Fees Ethics
N.J General Fund Own & Judicial Recommended
& User Fees Code of Ethics
Code ofBdt Judicial
N.Y. Budget $1.7 Million CAPA & Conduct & Recommended
CITY Appropriation Own City Conflicts & Final
of Interest Law
$ 2.13 Attorneys' Recommended
Million Code of Ethics & Final
N.D. General Fund $ 604,%, APA & Own Attorneys' Recommended
& User Fees Code of Ethics & Final
TENN.General Fund Canons of Recommended
N& User Fees $ 622,574 APA & Own Judicial Ethics
Recommended
WASH. User Fees $ 6 Million APA Own
= ia
XVI Journal of the National Assocaition of Administrative Law Judges 264
STATE FUNDING ANNUAL RULES OF CODEOF TYPE OF
SOURCES BUDGET PROCEDURE ETHICS DECISION
Canons of
$ 1.425 Ethics for
Wis. General Funds $1.425 APA & Own Attorneys & FinalMillion State
Employees
General &
WYo. Highway $ 600,000 In Process Not Yet Final
Funds
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CENTRAL PANEL STATES SURVEY 1992: TABLE 3
STATE QUALIFICATIONS STATUS OF SALARIES OF APPOINTMENT TERM LENGTH
OF HEARING HEARING HEARING OF CHIEF AU OF CHIEF ALJ
OFFICERS OFFICERS OFFICERS
CAL. Experienced $65,472- Appointed byAttorneys CivilService 83,088 Governor
COLO. Experienced Civil Service $43,632 - Civil Service No Time LimitAttorneys 58,464 Position
Experienced Appointed byFLA. Attorneys Civil Service $ 65,000 Governor & Open-ended
Attorneys Cabinet
MD. Members of the Exempt $33,000- Appointed by 6 YearsState Bar 62,000 Governor
Appointed by
MASS. Experienced $ 36,000- Sect. of Admin. Open-endedAttorneys Exempt 46,000 with Governor's
Approval
MINN. Experienced Civil Service $59,000- Appointed by 6 YearsAttorneys 65,000 Governor
MO. Experienced No Chief- All
Attorneys Exempt $65,000 ALJs Appointed 6 YearsA..orne.s by Governor
Attorneys or $66,150. Appointed by
N.J. Experience in Exempt 81,900 Governor 6 Years
Admin. Law 81,9__Goerno
Attorneys
N.Y. CITY Admitted in Non-competitive $61,103 - Appointed byNew York for 67,273 Mayor None
Five Years Min.
Experienced $ 44,000- Appointed byNC. Attorneys Civil Service 72,000 Chief Justice of 4 Years
State S. Ct.
Attorneys or Appointed by
N.D. Experience in Civil Service $ 23,484 - Governor with 6 Years
Admin. Law 46,092 Consent of
Senate
TENN. Experienced Exempt $ 32,616 - Appointed by Open-endedAttorneys 38,004 Sec. of State _pen-ended
WASH. Experience in Exempt $ 40,668- Appointed by 5 YearsAdmin. Law 52,056 Governor
Wis. Experienced Civil Service $ 27,500 Civil ServiceAttorneys CivilService_ 63,715 Position No Time Limit
Experienced
Attorneys; Five Exempt $40,944 - Appointed by Expires withYears Private 69,588 Governor Governors
Practice Min. Term
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CENTRAL PANEL STATES SURVEY 1995: TABLE 4[STATE IYEAR NAME ~ APPOINTING AUTHORITY, IAL~s1
____CREATED I IALU TERM ,_ __J
CAL. 1945 Dep't of General Governor, 4 years 38
Services, Office of coterminous
Admin. Hearings
COLO. 1976 Dep't of Admin., Div. of Director of 25
Admin. Hearings Administration
FLA. 1974 Dep't of Admin., Div. of Governor & Cabinet 32
Admin. Hearings
GA. 1994 Office of State Admin. Governor 33
Hearings
HAW. 1990 Office of Admin. Governor 4
Hearings
IOWA 1986 Dep't of Inspections & Governor, 4 years 16
Appeals, Appeals & Fair
Hearings Div.
KY. 1994 Office of Attorney Attorney General 4
General, Div. of Admin.
Hearings
LA. 1995 Dep't of State Civil Governor 42
Serv., Div. of Admin.
Hearings
MD. 1989 Office of Admin. Governor, 6 years 55
Hearings
MASS. 1974 Admin. Law Appeals Secretary of 8
Div. Administration & Finance
MINN. 1976 Office of Admin. Governor, 6 years 67
Hearings
Mo. 1978 Admin. Hearings Governor, 6 years 2
Comm'n
N.J. 1978-79 Office of Admin. Law Governor, 6 years 45
N.C. 1988 Office of Admin. Chief Justice, 4 years 9
.... __Hearings
N.D. 1991 Office of Admin. Governor, 6 years 4
Hearings
S.C. 1993-94 Office of Admin. Legislature 6
T-earinga _
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STATE YCEAR NAME JAPPOININ AUTHORITY, jAUs-]CREATED I AIJ TERM
TENN. 1974 Admin. Procedures Div. Secretary of State 10
TEX. 1991 Office of Admin. Governor, 2 years 70
Hearings
WASH. 1981-82 Office of Admin. Governor, 5 years 64
Hearings
Wis. 1983 Dep't of Admin., Div. of Governor 15
Hearings & Appeals
WYo. 1992 Office of Admin. Governor, 4 years 11
Hearings coterminous
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In response to important issues raised during the deliberations
on House Joint Resolution 51 during the 1987 legislative session,
Governor Schaefer appointed a Task Force on Administrative
Hearing Officers by letter dated December 24, 1987. A copy of that
letter is attached as Appendix A.
In his letter, the Governor indicated that there is a significant
dissatisfaction among memb, rs of the Bar, the business community,
and the public, in regard to the existing system of selecting and
using administrative Hearing Officers. In the various offices within
the Executive Branch, administrative appeals are heard by persons
who are employed by that particular agency. (Types of hearings
presently conducted are shown in Appendix G.) As such, these
Hearing Officers are subject to the control and supervision of the
agency which has rendered a decision or taken some action that is
the subject of the appeal heard by the Hearing Officer. Naturally,
the business, licensee or citizen who has contested the agency's
action is concerned that they may not receive a fair hearing before
this Hearing Officer. By contrast, a "Central Panel" of Hearing
Officers, as employed by other states, combines the Hearing
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Officers in a single independent unit, which provides hearing
examiner services to a wide variety of State agencies.
In addition, other criticisms of the present system are that
Hearing Officers often receive no training in conducting hearings
or writing the resulting opinions, and that the Hearing Officers are
not well supervised. Critics have also pointed out that the
procedures and standards for the conduct of administrative hearings
vary from State agency to State agency, and that the administrative
hearing process is poorly operated. Furthermore, it is alleged that
written opinions issued by Hearing Officers frequently do not
withstand judicial scrutiny.
Because more people are affected by administrative decisions
rendered by State agencies than by decisions of the judiciary,
agency decisions have a pervasive influence in our society, and it
is important that the citizenry of Maryland perceive the
administrative appeal process as being fair and impartial. In his
letter, the Governor indicated that it is important to improve upon
the existing administrative hearing process, and to ensure fair and
efficient administrative justice.
The Governor charged the 15 members of the Task Force
(membership is attached as Appendix B) to examine the current
system of selecting and using administrative Hearing Officers and
to recommend needed changes to improve the system. The Task
Force was specifically charged with answering the following
questions, and a summary of our recommendations follows each
individual question.
1. Is there a need to create a centralized system of administrative
hearing officers, as has been done in a number of states? If so,
how should the centralized system be structured and financed?
The Task Force overwhelmingly recognizes the need
for and recommends the creation by statute of a
centralized system of Administrative Law Judges in
Maryland. The system should be financed as are the
current units within State government, i.e. through
the normal budgetary processes and allocations.
Because the new system would be much more
efficient than the present one, whatever additional
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funds are needed to create it, would be offset by
savings in the long run.
2. If a centralized system of administrative hearing officers is not
needed, what specific changes should be made to Maryland's
current system of selecting and using administrative hearing
officers?
The Task Force believes that the better course of
action lies with creation of a centralized system of
Administrative Law Judges, as this approach would
be more efficient than trying to correct, in a
piecemeal fashion, the existing problems. The
centralized system would not sacrifice agency
expertise or eliminate ultimate agency responsibility
for final decisions, but would ensure that facts are
determined and proposed decisions rendered in an
unbiased manner.
3. What qualifications and training should be required of
administrative hearing officers?
The Task Force recommends that the Administrative
Law Judges be individuals admitted to the Bar, that
relevant experience be required for employment, and
that ongoing training be instituted. However,
existing non-lawyer hearing officers would be
retained, and these positions would be upgraded
through attrition.
4. What procedures should be instituted to insure that the most
qualified people are hired and retained as administrative hearing
officers?
The Task Force recommends that the Administrative
Law Judge cadre be hired as unclassified employees,
but that their dismissal be only "for cause." These
judges should be better paid, and compensated in a
more uniform fashion.
5. How should the performance of the administrative hearing
officers and the overall process of administrative hearings be
evaluated?
A Chief Administrative Law Judge should be made
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responsible for ensuring an effective and efficient
hearing process. Legislative audits or an advisory
board could provide oversight.
6. What specific procedures should be adopted to insure that the
administrative hearing process is consistent throughout the
State?
With the consolidation of hearing functions within
one office under one Chief Administrative Law
Judge, consistency should follow institutionally as a
matter of course. Additionally, it should be possible
to adopt one set of procedures for governing the
contested case hearing process throughout all State
agencies involved.
More expansive replies to the above six inquiries are contained in
part IV, below.
II. MATERIAL REVIEWED AND TESTIMONY RECEIVED
Pursuant to the Governor's charge letter, the Interim Report of
this Task Force was issued on January 29, 1988, and a copy of that
document is attached as Appendix C. As noted in the Interim
Report, the Task Force members received their notice of
appointment during the week of January 11, 1988. The first meeting
of the Task Force took place during the evening of January 13, and
10 subsequent evening meetings took place, the last of which was
on May 18, 1988. The Task Force members heard testimony on the
deficiencies of the present system for hearing officers in Maryland.
We also reviewed background material on the "central panel"
concept that is used to a variety of degrees in approximately 13
other States around the country. In addition, the Task Force
received in-person testimony, and was able to hear from and ask
questions of the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the State of
Minnesota, where the central panel concept was initiated many
years ago, as well as from the Chief Administrative Law Judge for
the State of New Jersey, which state also has a central panel. Other
background material was distributed to each Task Force member,
a partial list of which is listed in Appendix H.
XVi Journal of the National Assocaition of Administrative Law Judges 272
In addition to these and other written materials, the Task Force
heard from a variety of persons in Maryland who were interested
in the subject matter before the Task Force. These persons are listed
in Appendix D.
Also, the public was notified of our meetings and invited to
attend, by way of advertisements published of at least some of our
meetings, in the Daily Record, and in the Department of Legislative
Reference's weekly publication on legislative committee and task
force meetings.
Testimony delivered to the Task Force during its deliberations
reflect the following problems in the existing system:
1. Presently, Hearing Examiners in the State are employed by,
and under the control of, the agency where the contested case
or other disputed action arises. Quite naturally, this gives the
appearance of an inherent unfairness or bias against the
appellant. Since the Hearing Examiners work for the agency
which is a party to the dispute, citizens, businesses and some
attorneys believe they will not receive impartial adjudication of
their appeal, as the agency can hire and fire the Hearing
Examiners, decide on their promotional opportunities and
salary adjustments, their office accommodations, location of
their work site, parking privileges, support staff, budget, and
other managerial prerogatives, all of which impact in a major
way upon the livelihood and working environment of the
Hearing Examiners. We note, however, that while the
appearance of inherent unfairness is alleged, no proof of actual
bias was shown to this Task Force.
2. The Merit System selection process weeds out the people low
salaries tend to attract, i.e. young people, because hiring
preferences are mandated to be given to veterans, and which
practice tends to exclude most women, since they are usually
not veterans of the military. Consequently, the Merit System
selection process often prevents consideration of a large
percentage of the labor pool. The low salaries which are paid
Hearing Examiners also serves to discourage the more
competent and well-qualified individuals from applying, as they
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cannot afford their normal standard of living on the State
salaries which are offered. Better candidates are generally
found outside of the Merit System, i.e. through hiring
contractually or by obtaining individuals on a temporary (TP)
basis.
3. Burnout exists to one degree or another among the Hearing
Examiners in the different agencies, particularly in those
agencies which only conduct one or two types of hearings.
Some examiners spend years and years hearing and deciding the
same type of case.
4. Smaller agencies may not have any Hearing Examiners on its
staff. As a result, contractual Hearing Examiners are employed,
requiring the agency to advertise for such services on bid, with
bids being received by local members of the Bar. While this
provides the independence that is sought, it is difficult for that
individual to build up any expertise, or for the agency to be
assured of expertise of the Hearing Examiner, since only
limited experience is gained in that fashion. Some other
agencies have only one Hearing Examiner, which allows for
some ongoing experience to be accumulated by that individual;
however, there is no peer consultation available, and an
excessive amount of time is spent in researching issues, finding
solutions, and in "recreating the wheel". Sole Hearing
Examiners feel isolated without access to other more
experienced Examiners, and they have no backup coverage in
times of illness, or other absences such as maternity leave,
vacation periods, and during times of excessive workload.
5. There are no Statewide consistent minimum qualifications for
State employees hearing cases. Some Hearing Examiners have
no law school training whatsoever, others are not members of
the Bar, yet the typical Hearing Examiner is required to rule on
procedural and evidentiary problems which are presented for
the parties during the course of the hearing by licensed
attorneys. The resulting rulings if erroneous can result in a
disappointed or aggrieved citizen or business. This engenders
a disrespect for the process, and a disenchantment with the
justice which is supposed to be forthcoming from the Executive
XVI Journal of the National Assocaition of Administrative Law Judges 274
Branch of State government. A basic problem is that Bar
membership is not a minimum requirement to be a Hearing
Examiner within Maryland State service. While not
taaranteeing proficiency in the legal arena, having passed the
Maryland Bar is an indication that the individual is adept at the
proper application of legal principles and the rules of evidence.
-Tearing Examiners who have not mastered this knowledge in
law school as confirmed by admission to the Bar are not going
to master it through on-the-job training during a six month
probation period upon being hired in the State Merit System.
In other States and in the Federal government, Bar
membership is required as a minimum qualification for the
administrative law judge position. Some agencies of Maryland
State government which employ contractual Hearing Examiners
require those individuals to be members of the Bar: for
example, the Department of Education; the Department of
Agriculture; the Nursing Home Appeal Board; the Retirement
and Pension Systems; and the Health Claims Arbitration Office.
While some Hearing Examiner classifications allow for the
substitution of Bar membership for the required number of
years of experience, the low salary which is set for Hearing
Examiner positions precludes most Bar members from even
applying for the positions and, consequently, members of the
Bar seldom appear on the eligible list for possible selection to
Hearing Examiner classifications.
6. Hearing Examiners who are assigned to a particular agency
cannot absorb a sudden influx of new cases as occurs from time
to time, and they are not able to pick up heavier caseloads
caused by long term illnesses or other absences of their
co-workers. Similarly, an excess number of Hearing Examiners
in one agency, caused by a drop in caseload, cannot easily be
deployed to other agencies which may need help in their
hearing offices. In some agencies, there may occur a cyclical
influx of cases, as with Unemployment Insurance, or with the
Tax Refund Intercept Program. As a result, individual offices
may be extremely burdened during one time of the year, and
then relatively inactive during other periods of the year.
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7. The status of Hearing Examiners is perceived to be very low.
There is a lack of prestige in holding such an office, and there
is perceived to be a lack of respect of the private Bar for some
of the Hearing Examiners. Recruitment for these positions
when vacancies arise is difficult, since these are not
sought-after positions by bright law school graduates. The low
salaries and the often routine sameness of the cases serves to
discourage many energetic and competent individuals from
applying for these important positions, contributing to a
self-perpetuating decline of quality of staff.
8. Training for hearing examiners is necessary. However, in the
fragmented system as now exists, development of a training
program is not practical, since it requires a great deal of time,
effort and expertise. Although the hearing process is very
similar among State agencies, the scattering of separate hearing
offices results in each individual unit being too small to warrant
the necessary agency resources to be devoted to training
Hearing Examiners.
Currently, the training of Hearing Examiners is sporadic or
non-existent, or if it exists, expensive. There is no one source
of expertise or schooling on how to be an effective and
competent hearing examiner, other than the National Judicial
College in Reno, Nevada. Attendance there would approximate
$2,000 per individual. Presiding examiners need to be expert
in handling objections, motions, intervenors, expert witnesses,
and a full range of procedural and evidentiary problems which
are attendant to many of the contested cases heard by the State's
Hearing Examiners. There is no ongoing continuing education
which is presently provided to the State's Hearing Examiners.
Related to this, it has been pointed out that there is a need for
an increased level of professionalism among these individuals.
The quality of the decision-writing of the hearing examiners
has been challenged. Some hearing examiners are not familiar
with the rules of evidence which should be applied in these
proceedings, and are either overly inclusive or overly exclusive
of testimony and documentary evidence. It has been said that
written administrative decisions do not stand up to judicial
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scrutiny on review. Hearing Examiners in several agencies are
perceived to take too long to issue decisions, and backlogs in
caseloads are not infrequent.
9. Some Hearing Examiners are seen by individuals who appear
before them to exhibit a bias against one of the parties, either
against the citizen/business or against the agency. Some
Hearing Examiners exhibit boredom and disinterest in presiding
over their hearings.
10. An effective review of the Hearing Examiners' written work
product or conduct of the hearing is generally not made. It is
perceived that supervisors only check for the correctness of the
decision, i.e. its "bottom line" result.
11. Some Hearing Examiners are merely "doing time" until
retirement. Some Hearing Examiners are not of judicial
temperament. Under the Merit System, there is no existing way
to select individuals based on such legitimate personality
factors.
12. Some Hearing Examiners fail to develop the record and pursue
questions where the appellant is not represented by legal
counsel. If their decision consequently goes against the
appellant, and if an appeal to court is filed, this can result in a
time-consuming, expensive, and detrimental process to the
citizens/businesses.
13. The current fragmented hearing offices do Pot allow for the
pooling of resources. There is no central library of
administrative law decisions. Administrative decisions of an
agency may be overturned in court, and other agencies may not
learn of the court's decision, with the result that similar
unlawful or improper practices may be continued at these other
agencies.
14. In many of the cases heard by boards and commissions
throughout the State, an Assistant Attorney General presents
evidence to the board or commission, and another Assistant
Attorney General advises that board or commission on how to
rule on legal motions and evidentiary rulings, and guides the
boards and commissions on the content and form of the
resultant decision. The perception of the appellants before the
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board and commissions, again, is that the administrative agency
has stacked the deck against them.
15. The myriad regulations which apply to hearings conducted by
the wide variety of State agencies may discourage the private
Bar from providing free or low cost legal representation to the
poor of the State, since attorneys are required to spend
additional time in familiarizing themselves with the procedural
regulations of the several agencies. This presents an obstacle to
the effective and fair presentation of cases before administrative
agencies on behalf of individuals who cannot afford to pay for
private legal counsel, but who nevertheless do need effective
legal representation to obtain such benefits as unemployment
insurance and welfare benefits.
16. The fragmented administrative hearing process presently in
existence mitigates against any concerted effort being given to
modernize the State's Administrative Procedure Act. With a
number of concerned offices spread throughout the State
agencies, there is ro opportunity to share opinions and discuss
problems within the existing system, as the individual State
agencies are too myopic or weak to propose the necessary
changes.
17. In those agencies where a cadre of Hearing Examiners do exist,
some legal counsel for the agency do not fully present their
points and authorities, or do not fully develop their facts and
arguments in support of the agency's position, possibly because
they perceive that the "captive" hearing examiner is already
inclined to rule in favor of the agency.
18. The current Hearing Examiners who are not attorneys are not
subject to the Code of Professional Responsibility nor to the
Judicial Code of Ethics, both of which are mechanisms which
would serve to heighten and professionalize the quality of
hearings conducted in the administrative arena.
19. Separate agencies, by sending their respective Hearing
Examiners to the same area of the State on the same or adjacent
days to do only a few hearings, cause a toss of efficiency, and
a waste of taxpayers' money. Cumulative travel time under the
existing system is excessive.
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20. Hearing Examiners employed by an agency are required to
obtain their legal advice and guidance from their assigned
Assistant Attorney General who, in most cases, is the same
individual who, or from the same office, which appears before
the Hearing Examiner in presenting the agency's case for
adjudication. This results in the appearance of an unhealthy
symbiotic relationship developing between the adjudicatory
Hearing Examiner and the partisan Assistant Attorney General.
21. Salaries must be at a level to recruit and retain excellent staff,
and a career ladder must exist to encourage competent
adjudicators to remain in State government service. The pay
scales for entry level Hearing Examiners, who are required in
some cases to have a J.D. degree and two years of experience,
are approximately the same as paid to school teachers who are
newly graduated from college with a Bachelor's degree, and
who work a ten-month year, and the salaries are about the same
as is paid to registered nurses who do not have a Bachelor's
degree.
Contractual court reporter services are paid approximately
twice as much per hour as the Hearing Examiner who is
presiding over the hearing, and that Hearing Examiner also
receives a lower salary than the Assistant Attorney General or
the Assistant Public Defender who appear before him. The
national data show that Maryland Hearing Examiners earn less
than half of the average salary nationwide for comparable
positions. Paralegals and legal secretaries in the Baltimore area
receive equivalent or higher salaries. Within State government,
there is presently a great variety in the range of salaries paid to
contractual Hearing Examiners, and so too even among Merit
System Hearing Examiners who are employed by the various
Departments in State Government. For example, contractual
Hearing Examiners employed by the Department of Education,
Nursing Home Appeal Board, and Retirement and Pension
Systems are paid between $47 per hour and $70 per hour.
Hearing Examiners with the Motor Vehicle Administration earn
approximately $14 per hour. The chief adjudicative position in
the Department of Personnel has a salary fixed approximately
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$5,000 higher than the comparable position in the Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene.
Many of the problems existing with the State's existing
administrative hearing process can be related to the low levels
of salaries paid for this work.
III. FINDINGS SUPPORTING A CENTRAL PANEL
As more information was gathered from the speakers and from
the written material presented, the ultimate vote of the Task Force
was overwhelmingly in favor of the central panel concept. During
the course of our deliberations, we have identified a number of
arguments which favor the recommendation of the central panel
concept.
1. Having Hearing Officers assigned to a Central Panel would
better indicate to the citizens and business community of
Maryland that they would in fact receive an impartial and
unbiased adjudication of their appeal. The Administrative Law
Judges would not be dependent upon the agency-party for
continued employment, salary, promotions, benefits, office
space, parking permits, etc., and would not be subject to
retribution or "control" via a diminution of those items.
2. Establishment of a Central Panel would facilitate a
comprehensive and meaningful restructuring of pay scales and
minimum qualifications, which would lead to a more
professional and more capable corps of adjudicators who could
render better decisions, faster. The current system has a chaotic
pay and job classification fabric. Combining all hearings could
result in multi-tier job classifications or designations, with
salaries reflecting the type of hearing, and providing staff with
an incentive to perform well.
3. A properly constituted Central Panel would preserve the
expertise presently existing with current Hearing Examiners,
who would continue to be used, at least initially, to hear cases
from their former agency. However, cross-training would
occur, and these Administrative Law Judges would become
proficient in more than one subject, thereby increasing their job
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satisfaction, as well as their value to the State.
4. Establishment of a Central Panel would allow for peer
consultation, with the more experienced ALJs providing
guidance and the benefit of their experiences to junior ALJs.
5. Back-up coverage necessary due to illnesses or other absences
would be available. Larger number of cross-trained ALJs
would allow a sudden influx of cases to be handled
expeditiously. Since caseloads are not predictable or within an
agency's control, the number of ALJs in agencies under the
present system may be too high or too low, and the Central
Panel would even out the workload.
6. Serving with a Central Panel ALJ corps would enhance the
prestige and self-worth of the adjudicator, and a Central Panel
would serve as magnet to which bright and capable attorneys
would be drawn to government service. It would become an
agency to which the better law school graduates would seek to
apply, due to its prestige, the variety of cases, and the
opportunities for intellectual stimulation and service to the
public. It could employ law clerks and student interns, who
could gain insight into the burgeoning practice of
Administrative Law, and who could serve as ALJs upon
passage of the Bar exam and upon gaining professional legal
experience,
7. A Central Panel, due to its larger size, could develop a training
program for ALJs to ensure that decisions are well-written, and
that they could withstand scrutiny on appeal. A Central Panel
would allow for better supervision of ALJs, and improvement
through better supervision could be gained in demeanor and
temperament. A Central Panel would facilitate the
establishment of performance evaluation standards. A code of
ethics for Administrative Law Judges could be developed and
implemented by the Chief Administrative Law Judge.
8. A Central Panel would allow for the pooling of law books,
journals, and support staff, and it would be economical to
subscribe to electronic data research systems, such as
WESTLAW or LEXIS. Duplicate subscriptions to the
Annotated Code and to COMAR and other materials could be
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eliminated, with savings realized thereby. Non-productive
travel time could be cut drastically by assigning one ALJ to
hear a variety of agencies' appeals in a given region of the
State, since several Hearing Examiners, each from a different
agency, travel there now. This would also increase the speed
and efficiency of rendering decisions.
9. Establishment of a Central Panel would allow for a uniform or
standardized format for decision writing. Decisions could be
published, indexed and cross-indexed for the benefit of the
ALJs, the practicing Bar, State administrators, and the public.
A body of administrative law would thereby be developed to
guide participants in resolving future problems, without having
to resort to the expense of an adjudicatory hearing.
10. Having a Central Panel would facilitate the establishment of a
single legal advisor to assist ALJs, someone who is well-versed
in administrative law, and who does not appear before the
Hearing Examiner to argue in contested cases.
11. A Central Panel would be a focal point from which would
emanate suggested changes to pertinent statutes, such as the
Administrative Procedure Act. The current fragmentation of
hearing offices results in isolated, myopic, and disorganized
approaches to bettering the State's APA.
12. A Central Panel would function more as an independent fact
finding tribunal and proposer of decisions without sacrificing
the ultimate agency responsibility for final decision-making.
Attorneys on both sides would respect the process more, and
would be more vigorous and exacting in their presentations,
which would serve the ends of justice better, not only for the
agency, but also for the citizenry/business concerns as well.
13. If ALJs were not attached to agencies, there would be a greater
likelihood that agencies would be required to articulate their
regulations more clearly, for the benefit of the regulated
public/industry.
As noted above, the Task Force has voted overwhelmingly in
favor of the Central Panel concept. We believe that the benefits of
consolidating most of the Hearing Officer functions presently
interspersed throughout the executive department into one office,
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with one Director, outweighs any of the perceived or anticipated
drawbacks. As noted earlier, there are approximately 13 states
which presently have consolidated their hearing functions into one
independent office. While some start-up difficulties would ensue, all
of the states which have embraced this concept have been satisfied
with the results, and have viewed the Central Panel model as a vast
improvement over their previous fragmented and disorganized
non-system, such as now exists in Maryland.
Evidence from these other States reflects that, by centralizing
these functions, tremendous economies of scale have resulted, and
taxpayers' money expended in the administration of this
quasi-judicial hearing function has been diminished greatly. For
example, in New Jersey, approximately 136 Hearing Examiners in
50 agencies were consolidated into a Central Panel. That office, as
a result of this consolidation of functions and consequent increased
efficiencies, now employs only 43 full-time administrative law
judges, with a 2 1/2 to 1 ratio of support staff to sitting ALJ. The
Chief Administrative Law Judge for New Jersey estimated for this
Task Force that if the old system had remained in place, the total
expenditures by the State for this service would now be
approximately 20 million dollars, yet under the central panel, the
State's cost is only 7.5 million dollars.
IV. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of our inquiry and study, and in regard to the
specific questions the Governor requested the Task Force to
address, our responses are as follows:
1. Is there a need to create a centralized system of administrative
hearing officers, as has been done in a number of States? If so,
how should the centralized system be structured and financed?
After due consideration and deliberation, the Task
Force overwhelmingly believes it is necessary to
create a centralized system of Administrative Law
Judges in Maryland. We believe that all presently
existing hearing examiners, with the exception of
highly unique agencies such as the Workmen's
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Compensation Commission, the Public Service
Commission, and the Inmate Grievance Hearing
Examiners within the Division of Corrections of
DPSC, should be organized into one independent
office within the Executive Department. We believe
the centralized system should be structured with a
Chief Administrative Law Judge, an appropriate
number of Deputies or Assistants, and utilize the
existing hearing personnel who are now scattered
throughout and employed by the various State
agencies. The system should be financed as are the
current units within State government, i.e. through
the normal budgetary processes and allocations.
Some other states having a Central Panel finance
these operations by charging user agencies on a "fee
for service" basis. However, we feel that Maryland's
budgeting process can easily accommodate a
centralized system, and anticipated savings with the
new system should readily become apparent. The
fiscal note for HB 1374, a bill introduced in the 1988
Session which has many of the characteristics we are
recommending here, indicated that the cost of
establishing such a new office could range from
$190,000 to $727,000. The Task Force believes that
this upper estimate may be too high, and that the
initial expenditures could possibly be diminished by
phasing in the transfer of hearing officers or
staggering over time their move to a central location.
2. If a centralized system of administrative hearing officers is not
needed, what specific changes should be made to Maryland's
current system of selecting and using administrative hearing
officers?
The Task Force has looked at the possibility of
refraining from recommending a centralized system
of Administrative Law Judges, and suggesting
changes to the existing system; however, given the
breadth of the problems noted, we strongly feel that
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the better course of action would be to adopt the
Central Panel concept, as its benefits greatly
outweigh any perceived defects.
3. What qualifications and training should be required of
administrative hearing officers?
It is the considered opinion of the Task Force
members that membership in the Bar should be the
minimum requirement for persons employed by the
Central Panel as professional adjudicators. However,
so as not to unduly work a hardship upon existing
State employees who do not have this qualification,
we would propose that such individ'ials be
grandfathered into the new system with no
dimunition [sic] in pay, but that new hires be
members of the Bar. Preferred qualifications would
include past experience in presiding over
administrative hearings or court hearings, or
participation as counsel in evidentiary hearings under
the APA, or in court.
4. What procedures should be instituted to insure that the most
qualified people are hired and retained as administrative hearing
officers?
Due to the critical importance of the decisions made
by these positions, and since the experience of the
existing hearing offices [sic] has been less than
satisfactory in regard to their ability under Merit
System procedures to hire the best qualified
individuals, we recommend that the Administrative
Law Judge cadre be hired in the unclassified service,
but that the dismissal of Administrative Law Judges
be only "for cause". Such a hybrid employment
system between the classified and unclassified
services would ensure that persons selected to fill
these positions would possess the necessary
personality, temperament and judicial qualities, in
addition to formal education and training, to perform
effectively as Administrative Law Judges. In
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addition, since dismissal could only be "for cause,"
these Administrative Law Judges would not be
subject to being dismissed upon the whim of an
agency head or other high government official who
is displeased with a particular decision rendered by
that individual. Assurance of a reasonable job tenure
is necessary to insure that an Administrative Law
Judge renders a decision based on the facts and
evidence, and not on account of improper or adverse
influence being brought by the individual or
individuals who are on the losing end of the case.
Current Hearing Examiners should retain their
Merit System status, as should the support personnel
who also would be moved to the new unit.
5. How should the performance of the administrative hearing
officers and the overall process of administrative hearings be
evaluated?
The Chief Administrative Law Judge should be made
responsible for enuring the efficient and effective
performance of the administrative hearing officers
assigned to this office, and should be reqvired to
ensure that the overall process of conducting
administrative hearings is operating satisfactorily.
The Chief Administrative Law Judge should consult
with the Hearing Examiners of the various units
within State government and work with them in
setting appropriate standards to insure that hearings
are processed promptly throughout the system. In
addition, the Legislative Auditor could monitor the
processes of the Central Panel office. Another
alternative would be to establish an advisory
committee or policy committee, the members of
which would be appointed by the Governor, to
ensure effective oversight of this office.
6. What specific procedures should be adopted to insure that the
administrative hearing process is consistent throughout the
State?
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With the merger of all hearing units into one
independent office, headed by a Chief Administrative
Law Judge, it should be possible to develop one set
of procedural regulations which would uniformly
apply to the hearing of contested cases throughout all
of the executive agencies. Any required variation in
procedure should be able to be kept to an absolute
minimum.
V. CONCLUDING SUMMARY
In summary, we would note that the members of the Task Force
believe that the Central Panel concept, as outlined here, should be
instituted in Mar.yland by appropriate legislation, with the
particulars of a bill to be finalized by the Executive. We note that
there is a real dissatisfaction among the citizens and businesses
within Maryland with the existing administrative hearing process,
as evidenced by recent events involving the Parole Commission, the
Commission on Medical Discipline, and the Commission on Human
Relations. The present fragmented system mitigates against the
efficient disposition of appeals, primarily because of the inadequacy
of the personnel and employment process. Since the minimum
requirement for many of these positions is graduation from law
school, it is apparent that the salaries are unattractive to individuals
who have had to pay tuition and related expenses for college and
law school. A Hearing Examiner in the nearby Washington, D.C.
city government begins at approximately $40,000 per year, and
those in New Jersey begin at $52,000 per year. The Task Force
believes that much of the dissatisfaction with the current system
insofar as it pertains to the demeanor, expertise, and productivity
of the Hearing Examiners can be traced to the salary levels which
are offered. We believe, however, that with the mandated
requirement that these individuals be members of the Bar, salary
levels will be set appropriately so that qualified and competent
individuals will be attracted to this very important service within
Maryland State government.
Finally, we emphasize that with the establishment of a Central
Panel of Administrative Law Judges, the individual agency heads
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will retain the ultimate decision-making authority which the law
mandates be theirs. Therefore, while the initial hearing, with the
testimony of witnesses and the presentation of documentary
evidence, will be conducted by a Central Panel ALJ the final
agency decision rests with the executive head of the governmental
unit which is involved. As Justice Frankfurter noted more than 35
years ago, an impartial and disinterested adjudicator preserves both
the appearance and reality of fairness "generating the feeling, so
important to popular government, that justice has been done," Joint
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951). By
having a Central Panel Administrative Law Judge render the initial
decision, the critical legal requiremeni of providing administrative
due process is enhanced for Maryland's citizens and businesses.
